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ABSTRACT 
Based on nothing more than John Henry Wigmore’s personal belief 
that a witness under the throes of excitement is unable to fabricate an 
untruthful statement, the excited utterance exception allows parties to 
present out-of-court statements to the jury or judge without any of the 
safeguards the judicial system uses to promote honest and accurate 
testimony. This Article collects and examines much of the scientific 
evidence bearing on Wigmore’s premise and identifies two paradoxical 
conclusions that undermine the exception. First, the premise itself is 
unfounded; science absolutely does not support the notion that a witness 
is incapable of lying while emotionally agitated. But, there is a second 
phenomenon at work that counteracts the premise (were it valid); 
witnesses under extreme emotional stress are unreliable observers and 
reporters of the events causing the stress. Thus, in the unlikely event that 
an occurrence was sufficiently stressful to impede the ability to lie, the 
stress would also interfere with the ability to perceive and describe the 
occurrence reliably. Based on this paradox, this Article concludes that the 
excited utterance exception is both broken and irreparable, and therefore 
recommends abandoning the excited utterance exception altogether. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A truck driver swerved off the road into an embankment and was 
badly injured.1 A second truck driver stopped and helped pull the injured 
driver from his burning truck.2 Twenty-three minutes later, the second 
driver called a friend and described the incident in emotional terms, 
apparently moved by the severity of the injured driver’s condition.3 When 
he arrived at his house a couple of hours later, the second driver described 
the same incident to his wife.4 The following morning, he described the 
event to a co-worker.5 All three times, he told the same story: he was 
following the injured driver’s truck, saw the accident, stopped in Good 
Samaritan fashion to help, and was traumatized by the experience. 
In ensuing litigation, the admissibility of these three out-of-court 
statements by the second driver was challenged. The court held that the 
first statement fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule, coming less than thirty minutes after the accident—a presumptive 
time limitation for the exception.6 The court deemed the other two 
statements outside the exception based on the greater passage of time.7 
The consequence of an excited utterance is that it comes into 
evidence without any of the safeguards the judicial system uses to promote 
honest and accurate testimony such as placing the speaker under oath, 
cross-examining, and observing the witness’s demeanor. The premise of 
the excited utterance exception is that when a witness is sufficiently 
emotional following an event, the witness will be incapable of fabricating, 
and, therefore, these safeguards are unnecessary. What leads the law to 
presume that extreme stress prevents a witness from lying? What leads the 
law to presume that a witness so emotionally overwrought as to be 
incapable of lying is a reliable observer and reporter of the event causing 
                                                     
     1. Prescott v. R & L Transfer, Inc., 111 F.Supp.3d 650 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
    2. Id. at 654. 
     3. Id. at 655. 
     4. Id. at 659. 
     5. Id. at 657–58.  
     6. Id. at 655–56. 
 7. Id. at 655–56. 
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the emotional upheaval? What leads the law to presume that thirty minutes 
is a critical, or even meaningful, period of time in this analysis? 
Certainly not science. Edward Cleary, a twentieth-century evidence 
scholar, wrote, “the rules of evidence largely have been constructed out of 
anecdotes and unsystematic observation, plus what hopefully passes for 
reason but could more honestly be labeled conjecture about human 
behavior.”8 No doctrine is more heavily based on conjecture than the 
excited utterance exception. 
Psychological studies suggest that stressful events trigger the “flight-
or-flight” response, and that deceptive statements are not only possible, 
they can be a natural component of the fight-or-flight response, such as 
statements designed to deflect guilt or blame away from the speaker or 
someone with whom the speaker is aligned. Not only are witness 
statements under intense stress not immutably truthful, but psychology 
also informs us that these witness statements are also inherently 
inaccurate. A traumatic event dramatically increases cognitive load, 
leading to perception deficits and distortions. Thus, excited witness 
perceptions tend to be unreliable for many reasons. 
Furthermore, when one considers these two scientific principles in 
juxtaposition, one realizes that they operate in an inverse relationship that 
systemically undermines the excited utterance exception. The premise of 
the exception is that as the stress of an incident increases, an observer’s 
ability to lie decreases. At the same time those stress levels are increasing, 
however, the reliability of the declarant’s observations and 
communications is also decreasing. If the stress level were to be so high 
that the declarant was rendered incapable of lying, any statement the 
declarant made in that condition would likely be unreliable. This paradox 
eviscerates the excited utterance exception. 
In Part I, this Article will start with a brief overview of the history of 
the excited utterance exception. In Part II, this Article will discuss the 
manner in which the courts have applied the excited utterance exception, 
highlighting the inconsistency in the standards that the courts apply. Part 
III will discuss some of the existing scholarship critical of the excited 
utterance exception. Part IV will present some of the scientific data that 
undermines the foundation of the excited utterance exception. Finally, the 
Article will conclude by recommending the abolition of the excited 
utterance exception. 
                                                     
 8. See MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EVIDENCE LAW 14 (2016) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 
VAND. L. REV. 277, 278 (1951–52)). The author is extremely grateful to Professors Saks and Spellman 
for providing an advance copy of their book. 
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I. GENESIS OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
The United States civil litigation system places live oral testimony, 
given under oath and subject to cross-examination, on a pedestal. Cross-
examination is, perhaps, the most probing tool for scrutinizing witness 
testimony. Justice Marshall described cross-examination as “the greatest 
safeguard of American trial procedure.”9 Professor John Henry Wigmore 
lavished even greater praise on cross-examination, deeming it “beyond 
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the 
truth.”10 
In addition to the probative value of cross-examination, other aspects 
of live testimony advance the truth-seeking function of trials. Witnesses 
feel pressure to tell the truth when testifying under oath, either from moral 
obligation or the threat of perjury prosecution.11 Live testimony also 
provides the jury or judge the opportunity to observe witness demeanor to 
evaluate reliability and credibility.12 For these reasons, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure place a strong emphasis on live testimony.13 
The hearsay rule seeks to protect these truth-promoting benefits of 
live testimony. Wigmore found origins of the concept of hearsay in the 
1500s.14 Prior to that time, jurors were supposed to bring their outside 
knowledge to trials and they could properly rely on “the communications 
of trustworthy neighbors” to advance the “prevailing conviction of the 
community.”15 That practice contrasts sharply with today’s jurors, who are 
typically cautioned to avoid any exposure to information or opinion 
outside the formal proceeding, and who can be excused for cause if they 
speak to anyone during the pendency of the case.16 
                                                     
 9. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1945)). 
 10. See Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against 
Hearsay, 63 K.L. REV. 717, 719 n.10 (2015) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974)). 
         11. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (noting that testimony under oath, “(1) 
insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—thus impressing him with the seriousness 
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the 
witness to submit to cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth’; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness 
in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility”).  
 12. See Perotti v. Quinones, 790 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 13. See, e.g., id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 43. 
 14. John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904). 
 15. Id. at 439. 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 47; Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1955) (creating a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice for communications between a third party and a juror); Barnes v. Joyner, 
751 F.3d 229, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (“An impartial jury is one that arrives at its verdict ‘based upon the 
evidence developed at trial’ and without external influences.” (citation omitted)); Fullwood v. Lee, 
290 F.3d 663, 682 (4th Cir. 2002) (case remanded because juror discussed the death penalty with her 
husband during the deliberations). 
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Wigmore found the rule against hearsay to be firmly established by 
the early 1700s.17 By the 1800s, courts were creating and regularly 
applying common law exceptions to the hearsay rule.18 Under these 
exceptions, out-of-court statements were admissible if they contained 
sufficient indicia of reliability to outweigh the intrinsic infirmities of 
hearsay.19 Such hearsay exceptions were lumped into a common law 
doctrine referred to as “res gestae.”20 
The res gestae exceptions embodied the concept that statements 
made spontaneously during or immediately following an act were, in 
essence, part of that act rather than merely a witness’s account of the act, 
and therefore should be admissible to explain the act.21 Common law res 
gestae included dying declarations, declarations of present sense 
impressions, and declarations of present bodily conditions or mental 
states.22 
Professor Wigmore championed the excited utterance exception that 
became part of the res gestae doctrine, although he used the phrase 
“spontaneous exclamation.”23 He greatly preferred it to the present sense 
impression exception because the excited utterance exception had a more 
flexible temporal component.24 Wigmore’s excited utterance exception 
had three criteria: (1) there must be a startling occasion; (2) the out-of-
court statement must be made before the declarant has had time to 
fabricate; and (3) the declarant’s out-of-court statement must relate to the 
                                                     
 17. Wigmore, supra note 14, at 448 (noting that the primary justification for the exclusion of 
hearsay was that “the other side hath no opportunity of a cross-examination.”). 
 18. Williams, supra note 10, at 720. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Literally “things done” or “the events at issue or others contemporaneous with them.” BRYAN 
A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 761 (2d ed. 1995); see also MICHAEL H. 
GRAHAM, 7 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803:2 (7th ed., 2015). 
 21. Williams, supra note 10, at 721–22; William Gorman Passannante, Res Gestae, The Present 
Sense Impression Exception and Extrinsic Corroboration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and 
its State Counterparts, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 96 (1988/89). 
 22. Williams, supra note 4, at 721–22. (noting that Professor Wigmore is generally credited with 
creating the excited utterance exception, which he championed over the present sense impression 
exception). 
 23. Williams, supra note 10, at 724 n.29; Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of 
the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 169 (1997). Wigmore did 
not invent the exception; indeed, he traced its roots back to Thompson v. Trevanion, a 1693 case. Id. 
at 170. 
 24. Williams, supra note 10, at 722 n.23 (“Wigmore famously stalled judicial acceptance of the 
[present sense impression] exception for decades.”) (quoting Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and 
the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 336–37 (2012)) (“By and 
large, the courts found Wigmore’s position persuasive. Until the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, only a few jurisdictions recognized the present sense impression.”) (quoting Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in 
Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 327–28 (2009)). 
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circumstances of the startling event.25 Under such circumstances, 
Wigmore believed, the stress of nervous excitement “stills the reflective 
faculties and removes their control,” such that any statements are a 
“spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and 
perceptions . . . .”26 In other words, Wigmore thought that a witness in the 
throes of excitement following a traumatic incident would be so 
incapacitated by emotion as to be unable, or at least unlikely, to lie. The 
likely truthful nature of such statements, the reasoning continues, trumps 
the lack of safeguards ordinarily associated with live, under oath testimony 
subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, courts should admit such 
statements even though they are hearsay. 
In 1975, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
common law doctrines of hearsay and res gestae became codified in 
federal courts.27 Hearsay is currently defined as “a statement that: (1) the 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement.”28 Federal Rule of Evidence 803 contains twenty-three 
exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply regardless of whether the 
declarant is available to testify as a witness.29 Federal Rule of Evidence 
804 contains five exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply only if the 
declarant is unavailable to testify as a witness.30 Federal Rule of Evidence 
807 contains the residual exception to the hearsay rule, allowing 
introduction of hearsay testimony that does not fit within the exceptions in 
Rules 803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence but is sufficiently 
trustworthy to warrant admission.31 
The excited utterance exception is one of the Rule 803 exceptions, 
available regardless of the declarant’s availability.32 It exempts from the 
hearsay rule a “statement relating to a startling event or condition, made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”33 
                                                     
 25. Id. at 726. 
 26. Id. at 726 n.38 (quoting 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE COMMON 
LAW § 1747 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1976). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 807 (allowing admission of a hearsay statement that: 1) has equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to those set forth in Rules 803 and 804; 2) is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; 3) is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 4) if admitted, will best serve 
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice). The rule also requires that 
the party offering evidence under Rule 807 provide adverse parties with advance notice. FED. R. EVID. 
807(b). 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 33. Id. 
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Most state rules of evidence employ identical, or nearly identical, language 
for their excited utterance exceptions.34 The present sense impression 
exception, the first cousin of the excited utterance exception, is also found 
in Rule 803, and exempts a “statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”35 
II. THE COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE 
EXCEPTION 
Although the excited utterance exception as set forth in Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(2) and in many state analogs is expressed in one fairly 
short sentence, the courts have not construed or applied the doctrine 
consistently. Rather, the following summaries illustrate the whimsical 
nature of judicial decisions applying the excited utterance exception.36 
A. Trial Court Applications of the Excited Utterance Exception 
It is not difficult to find cases that illustrate the lack of consistency 
in the trial courts’ application of the excited utterance exception. This 
section presents a sampling of those cases, grouped by category of factors 
the courts often consider in applying the exception. 
1. Passage of Time 
The courts are particularly inconsistent in factoring in the passage of 
time when applying the excited utterance exception. At the shorter end of 
the time spectrum, consider Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., in 
which the declarant was caught and dragged by a train.37 When the train 
stopped, he fell to the ground.38 Two witnesses heard his cries, and arrived 
approximately two and one-half minutes after the train stopped.39 Both 
witnesses heard the declarant state, “Save me. Help me—why did that 
conductor close the door on me?”40 The trial court excluded the statement 
as “narrative of a past event.”41 Similarly, in Alabama Power Co. v. Ray, 
an accident victim’s statement, made just five minutes after the incident, 
                                                     
 34. Williams, supra note 10, at 726 n.44 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 
(1992)). 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 36. Some of the following cases are criminal, not civil, and others are state courts applying the 
state analog to FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Despite these differences, they still illustrate the problems with 
the excited utterance exception. 
 37. 297 N.Y.S. 216, 218, 252 A.D. 142 (1937). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 217. 
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was deemed inadmissible because the witness was “merely giving a 
narrative of a transaction which was really and substantially past.”42 
At the longer end of the time spectrum, consider State v. Duke in 
which the defendant was accused of sexually molesting his three-year-old 
daughter.43 One evening approximately ten days after the incident, the 
daughter told her mother about the molestation.44 The following day, the 
mother took her daughter to a county agency, where a social worker 
interviewed the girl.45 They notified the police, who took the girl to a local 
hospital, where she spoke with a nurse.46 The girl was subsequently 
interviewed by a doctor at another hospital.47 The trial court held that the 
mother, social worker, nurse, and doctor could all testify as to the girl’s 
statements as excited utterances.48 The court held that there was no set time 
period for an excited utterance, so long as the statement was made “under 
the influence of the startling occurrence to such a degree that the statement 
could not have been the product of reflective thought.”49 
Similarly, in State ex rel. Harris v. Schmidt, the defendant was 
accused of assaulting his five-year-old stepson.50 The boy told his mother 
about it the next day but did not tell the defendant’s probation officer about 
it until fifteen days after the assault.51 The court allowed the probation 
officer to testify under the excited utterance exception.52 
In between these extremes, courts often seem to use thirty minutes as 
a default time period during which witnesses are unable to fabricate their 
testimony.53 Prescott v. R & L Transfer, Inc., illustrates the arbitrary nature 
of this default time period.54 In that case, the declarant witnessed a horrific 
truck accident and helped pull the driver from the burning truck.55 After 
departing the scene, he called a friend on his cell phone and described the 
                                                     
 42. 249 Ala. 568, 571, 32 So. 2d 219, 221 (1947). 
 43. No. 52604, 1988 WL 88862, *1 (Ohio 1988). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at *4–6. 
 49. Id. at *4. 
 50. 69 Wis.2d 668, 230 N.W.2d 890 (1975). 
 51. Id. at 672. 
 52. Id. at 684. 
 53. See Orenstein, supra note 23, at 182 (“The excited utterance exception, however, routinely 
admits statements made thirty minutes after the exciting event.”); see also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 30C 
FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 7043 (2014) (collecting cases); Time element as affecting admissibility 
of statement or complaint made by victim of sex crimes as res gestae, spontaneous exclamation, or 
excited utterance, 89 A.L.R.3d 102 (originally published in 1979) (collecting cases). 
 54. 111 F. Supp. 3d 650, 650–63 (W.D. Pa. 2015), reconsideration denied, No. CIV.A. 3:11-
203, 2015 WL 5136213 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2015). 
 55. Id. at 654. 
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events.56 There was conflicting testimony about whether this call occurred 
twenty-three minutes or forty minutes after the accident.57 The court 
emphasized that the call was only twenty-three minutes after the accident 
significant when it admitted the friend’s testimony under the excited 
utterance exception.58 
Thus, courts seem to use thirty minutes as a presumptive limit for 
excited utterances but have deemed hearsay statements made as little as 
two and one-half minutes after an event to be inadmissible as outside the 
influence of the event and statements made fifteen days after the incident 
to be admissible as excited utterances. Of course, none of these time 
periods has any scientific support. 
2. Nature of the Event 
Courts are also inconsistent regarding the nature of the event that can 
support an excited utterance. For example, courts often require a 
“startling” event as the predicate for an excited utterance,59 but just how 
startling must an event be to “still the reflective faculties”60 such that the 
declarant is incapable of lying? 
Criminal cases often involve hearsay statements by the victim of the 
crime. Likewise, tort cases may involve hearsay statements by the person 
injured by the tort. Presumably, being seriously injured in an incident 
presents a relatively strong case for the application of the excited utterance 
exception. Sometimes, though, courts apply the excited utterance 
exception to statements made after far less impactful events. 
For example, in American Craft Hosiery Corp. v. Damascus Hosiery 
Mills, Inc., the court applied the excited utterance exception to a 
declarant’s statements made after a business meeting in which the 
declarant was told he could not proceed with a proposed contract.61 In U.S. 
v. Vazquez, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the 
declarant’s statement after learning that a co-defendant denied knowing 
the declarant (allegedly causing the declarant to fear that he would receive 
all the blame for the incident in question) was under the stress of 
excitement and thus within the excited utterance exception.62 
                                                     
 56. Id. 
       57. Id. at 656. 
 58. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir.1998) for the proposition that 
a forty-minute time span might be too long, while a fifteen to twenty-minute time span was not too 
long). 
 59. See the tests from the various courts of appeal described in the following section. 
 60. Williams, supra note 10, at 738 n.93. 
 61. 575 F. Supp. 816 (W.D.N.C. 1983). 
 62. 857 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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In U.S. v. Bailey, the declarant was a juror who a criminal defendant 
attempted to bribe.63 The trial court deemed the attempted bribe a “startling 
event” eligible for the excited utterance exception.64 In U.S. v. Lawrence, 
the defendant allegedly robbed the declarant.65 When the police arrested 
the defendant, they asked the declarant to identify the defendant, who was 
handcuffed and lying on the ground.66 The prosecutor then called the 
police officer to testify as to what the declarant had said.67 The court found 
the confrontation with the man who had allegedly just robbed him to 
support the excited utterance exception, even though the robber was 
constrained and posed no threat.68 
In U.S. v. Napier, the defendant allegedly kidnapped and physically 
assaulted the declarant.69 The declarant was hospitalized for seven weeks 
following the assault and underwent two brain operations.70 
Approximately one week after the declarant returned home, her sister 
showed the declarant a newspaper article with a photograph of the 
defendant.71 The sister was permitted to testify that the declarant’s reaction 
was “great distress and horror and upset,” and that she pointed to it and 
said, “He killed me, he killed me.”72 The defendant argued that the eight-
week lapse since the assault removed the case from the excited utterance 
exception, but the court held that the startling event was seeing the picture 
and allowed the testimony.73 
Finally, in David by Berkeley v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, 
the declarant saw the plaintiff’s mother, a pregnant woman, slip and fall 
on her stomach in a grocery store.74 The plaintiff’s father testified that he 
heard the declarant state shortly after the fall, “I told them to clean it up 
about two hours ago—an hour and a half ago.”75 The court held that 
witnessing a pregnant woman fall on her stomach was sufficiently startling 
to prevent the declarant from fabricating her statement.76 
As with the passage of time after the event, there is no scientific 
evidence supporting these decisions—and hundreds or thousands of 
                                                     
 63. 834 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 64. Id. at 228. 
 65. 699 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 66. Id. at 699–700. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 703–04. 
 69. 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 70. Id. at 317. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 318. 
 74. 740 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 75. Id. at 234. 
 76. Id. at 234–35. 
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others—deeming certain events sufficiently startling to render the 
declarant incapable of lying. The courts and treatises certainly do not cite 
studies suggesting that a declarant is incapable of lying after seeing a 
photograph of her assailant eight weeks after an assault. Or that attending 
a meeting where the declarant learns he will not be awarded a contract will 
render the declarant unable to fabricate. 
3. Declarant’s State of Mind or Demeanor 
As with the passage of time after and the nature of the startling event, 
the courts are inconsistent about the evidence regarding the declarant’s 
state of mind required to bring a statement within the excited utterance 
exception. Judicial opinions reflect inconsistencies from one court to the 
next, inconsistencies within single opinions from one statement to another, 
and inconsistencies regarding the fundamental purpose of the exception. 
For example, in United States v. Tocco, the declarant was allegedly 
an accomplice to an act of arson.77 The witness heard the declarant’s 
statement three hours after the arson, and described the declarant as “all 
hyped” and “nervous.”78 The court concluded that the declarant’s 
excitement had not yet subsided when he made his statement, and 
therefore it constituted an excited utterance.79 
Contrast Tocco with Katona v. Fed. Exp. Corp., in which the 
declarant was in a car accident and subsequently made statements about 
the accident to a companion at a restaurant about an hour after the accident 
and to his wife five and a half hours after the accident.80 Although the 
declarant “appeared nervous and upset” at the time of his statements, the 
judge concluded that the passage of time, plus the fact that the declarant 
was able to drive away from the accident without calling for medical 
assistance, placed his statements outside the excited utterance exception.81 
In both cases, the declarant exhibited the same nervous and agitated 
state and the statements were a few hours after the incident. Yet, the courts 
reached the opposite conclusions. In reaching these conclusions, neither 
judge appeared to consider whether appearing nervous and agitated when 
making a statement—several hours after an incident—could just as easily 
be symptoms of lying about the incident as they could be indicators of 
telling the truth. 
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People v. Seymour provides an example of a court’s internal 
inconsistency within a single case.82 Two housing officers found the 
seventy-nine-year-old declarant lying face down in his apartment, hands 
tied behind his back and head bound with gauze to a table.83 The declarant 
had been robbed and confined forty-eight hours earlier, and he had 
suffered a heart attack in the interim.84 The declarant had lost his larynx to 
cancer eighteen years earlier and was unable to speak clearly without a 
voice box.85 When he arrived at the hospital, an hour and twenty minutes 
after being discovered, he was able to communicate to hospital staff that 
someone he knew who lived on the fourth floor of his building had 
committed the crimes.86 Twenty minutes later, a police officer arrived with 
the declarant’s voice box.87 Using the voice box, the declarant identified 
his assailant and provided additional details about the events.88 The 
declarant died from his injuries a few months after the burglary, and the 
prosecutor offered witnesses to testify as to the declarant’s statements.89 
The trial court admitted testimony regarding both statements under the 
excited utterance exception, but the appellate court reversed the trial 
court’s decision, holding that only the first statement was an excited 
utterance, and that the trial court’s admission of the second statement was 
reversible error.90 Because the declarant was actively receiving treatment 
at the time of the first statement, the court reasoned, he was too distracted 
to fabricate.91 By twenty minutes later, however, this elderly declarant had 
sufficiently recovered from his confinement and heart attack such that his 
statements about his assailant were no longer spontaneous.92 
Similarly, in Coyle v. Kristjan Palusalu Maritime Co., Ltd., the 
declarant was a deceased stevedoring contractor who had tripped over a 
wire and sustained injuries.93 In ruling on a hearsay objection to testimony 
by someone who heard the declarant’s statements after his fall, the court 
found one of his statements subject to the excited utterance exception and 
the other contemporaneous statement not covered.94 The court found that 
the declarant was “startled” by the incident, thus bringing his statement 
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“clearly” within the exception, because he had sustained a nosebleed from 
the fall,95 and because his nose was still bleeding, it demonstrated that he 
had not had sufficient time to reflect and fabricate.96 The court found his 
statement describing the incident to be admissible, but his simultaneous 
statement about the crew having replaced the wire recently to be outside 
the exception.97 
United States v. Davis may provide the best illustration of the 
disconnect between the various courts’ application of the excited utterance 
exception and the premise underlying the doctrine.98 In Davis, the 
declarant, a teenage babysitter, saw a man with a gun driving a car and 
was scared because she believed the man had committed a recent murder.99 
She called 911 almost immediately and reported the incident, giving the 
license plate and make of the car to the 911 operator.100 She also told the 
operator that the man had two guns but later admitted that she had 
exaggerated that detail in order to prompt the police to respond more 
quickly—in actuality, she only saw one gun.101 The judge allowed 
testimony regarding the 911 call, ruling that the declarant’s statements met 
all the elements of the excited utterance exception, and that her 
exaggerations went to weight, not admissibility.102 
Consider the questionable logic of this result. The justification for 
the excited utterance exception is that, if the declarant is still emotionally 
charged after a startling event, the declarant will not be able to think clearly 
enough to fabricate a statement. Here, the declarant admitted that she had 
altered her statement in order to achieve a result—a quick response by the 
police. Obviously, then, the fundamental premise underlying the 
exception—that the witness’s emotional state would prevent her from 
fabricating—did not apply to this declarant’s statement. Yet, the judge 
admitted the testimony. 
Furthermore, not only was the judge’s legal ruling inconsistent with 
the premise of the excited utterance exception, the facts undermine the 
core precept of the exception. The declarant made her statement thirty 
seconds to one minute after an event the court deemed startling, but rather 
than being incapable of fabrication, the declarant was admittedly able to 
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exaggerate the circumstances for a calculated objective.103 This 
remarkable teenage babysitter was apparently able to accomplish 
something that Wigmore believed impossible—she was able to think 
quickly enough to distort her description of a startling event in order to 
advance a personal interest while still in the excitement of the incident. 
While Wigmore might have been surprised by the facts of Davis, no 
psychologist would be. As explained below, there is no scientific support 
for the notion that nervousness, excitement, agitation, anxiety, or any of 
the other conditions that courts cite as supporting the excited utterance 
exception are more likely to be associated with truthfulness than with 
fabrication, exaggeration, or inaccuracy. 
B. Approaches in the United States Courts of Appeal 
As the trial courts struggle to apply the excited utterance exception 
intelligently and consistently, they are frequently applying tests crafted by 
the appellate courts. According to an analysis by Professor Matthew 
Janssen, the United States Courts of Appeal have developed seven distinct 
approaches to the excited utterance exception.104 Most of these tests entail 
lists of elements for assessing the applicability of the exception. The First, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply a three-factor test that turns on whether: 
“1) a startling event or condition occurred; 2) the statement was made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event 
or condition; and 3) the statement relates to the startling event or 
condition.”105 The Sixth Circuit employs a different three-factor test that 
admits hearsay statements when: (1) there is a startling event; (2) the 
declarant makes the statement before there is time to fabricate; and (3) the 
statement is made under the stress of the event’s excitement.106 
The Eighth Circuit expands the number of factors to six when 
considering whether a hearsay statement was an excited utterance: (1) the 
amount of time between the startling event and the statement; (2) whether 
the statement was the product of an inquiry; (3) the declarant’s age; (4) the 
declarant’s physical and mental condition; (5) the event’s characteristics; 
and (6) the statement’s subject matter.107 The Fourth Circuit applies a two-
pronged test that also pulls in many of the Eighth Circuit’s factors. The 
Fourth Circuit requires: (1) the declarant to experience a startling event or 
condition, and (2) the declarant to react from the stress caused by the event 
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and not from reflection or fabrication, using five of the Eighth Circuit’s 
factors to make this determination.108 
The Third Circuit has its own four-factor approach. It requires: “(1) 
a startling occasion, (2) a statement relating to the circumstances of the 
startling occasion, (3) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to 
observe personally the events, and (4) a statement made before there has 
been time to reflect and fabricate.”109 
Two circuits have tests that do not contain elements or factors. The 
Fifth Circuit asks “whether the statements were the product of reflective 
thought or whether they were the result of the startling event.”110 The 
Second Circuit “simply tries to determine whether the declarant was still 
under the excitement caused by the startling event.”111 
These seven approaches—with zero, two, three, four, or six factors—
reflect the murky subjectivity in the excited utterance exception. Yet, there 
are some common themes. The courts know that every statement following 
an incident is not automatically trustworthy. They accept the notion that a 
declarant in a sufficient state of excitement or emotional arousal from 
witnessing or experiencing a “startling” event should be considered 
trustworthy. They vest the trial judge with the discretion to assess whether 
the declarant made the hearsay statement in question under temporal and 
emotional circumstances rendering fabrication or distortion unlikely. Most 
importantly, though, they provide virtually no scientific guidance for the 
trial judge to exercise this discretion. 
C. Consideration by the United States Supreme Court 
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the excited utterance 
exception in F.R.E. 803(2) at least five times.112 In none of these cases was 
the Court actually adjudicating a lower court’s evidentiary ruling applying 
the excited utterance exception. Rather, the cases were all criminal cases, 
typically appealed on the basis of alleged violations of the Confrontation 
Clause, with the Court’s discussion of the excited utterance exception 
appearing in dicta. 
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Uniformly, the Court discussed the excited utterance exception in 
language that accepted both the exception itself and the reasoning 
underlying the exception. The Court generally repeated, without any 
probing analysis, Wigmore’s proposition that declarants are unable to 
fabricate or distort testimony when in a state of excitement. Likewise, the 
Court did not probe the lower court’s application of the exception with any 
meaningful scrutiny. 
For example, in White v. Illinois, the defendant was accused of 
sexually assaulting a four-year-old girl.113 The girl’s babysitter was 
awakened by the girl’s screams and saw the defendant leave the girl’s 
room.114 The babysitter spoke to the girl immediately, and the girl 
described inappropriate touching.115 The girl’s mother returned home 
about thirty minutes later, and the girl repeated her story.116 The mother 
called the police, who arrived about forty-five minutes after the incident, 
and the girl, once again, repeated her story.117 Approximately four hours 
after the incident, the girl was taken to the emergency room, where she 
repeated the story to a nurse and doctor.118 Over the defendant’s hearsay 
objection, the babysitter, mother, investigating officer, nurse, and doctor 
were all permitted to testify as to the girl’s out-of-court statements.119 
Although the appeal centered around the Confrontation Clause, the 
Court discussed the hearsay implications of these out-of-court 
statements.120 The Court opined that, not only were the hearsay statements 
sufficiently trustworthy to warrant admission, they were more likely 
reliable than live, in-court, after-the-fact testimony.121 The Court wrote 
that the statements should carry more weight because they were offered 
“in a moment of excitement—without the opportunity to reflect on the 
consequences.”122 Similarly, a statement “made in the course of procuring 
medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may 
cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of 
credibility.”123 The Court did not discuss, or even recognize, any 
uncertainty about whether the statements of a four-year-old child 
warranted the same deference that the hearsay exceptions accord to 
statements of adults. Similarly, the Court did not discuss whether the time 
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difference of the various statements—ranging from essentially 
contemporaneous with the event to four hours following—was material to 
its analysis. 
The Court’s language in these cases suggests that the Court embraces 
Wigmore’s belief that excited utterances are inherently trustworthy. In 
Idaho v. Wright, the Court expressed its view that excited utterances are 
sufficiently reliable so as to render cross-examination “superfluous.” 124 In 
Michigan v. Bryant, the Court stated that excited utterances are 
“considered reliable because the declarant, in the excitement, presumably 
cannot form a falsehood.” 125 The Court also quoted language from 
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: “The basis for the ‘excited utterance’ 
exception . . . is that such statements are given under circumstances that 
eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or 
confabulation . . . .”126 Thus, the Court seemed to endorse the idea that, 
not only is it less likely that a declarant would lie while still in an excited 
state, it is impossible. 
Only in Navarette v. California, did the Court seem to question the 
broad application of the excited utterance exception. 127 The Court wrote, 
“It is the immediacy that gives the statement some credibility; the 
declarant has not had time to dissemble or embellish.”128 The Court 
reasoned that a declarant who had time to observe the license number of 
the offending vehicle, bring her car to a halt, copy down the license 
number, and call the police had “[p]lenty of time to dissemble or 
embellish.”129 
D. Scientific Guidance for Judges 
One explanation for why the courts are so inconsistent in their 
application of the excited utterance exception is that there are no rigorous 
science-based explanatory materials available for judges. Judges are given 
broad discretion to implement the doctrine, but not supplied with any 
evidence-based basis for exercising that discretion. 
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 803(2) certainly are not much 
help. The original 1975 notes explain the exception: “The theory of 
Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of 
excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces 
utterances free of conscious fabrication.”130 This explanation is followed 
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by a brief discussion of whether the statement itself may be the only proof 
of the startling event or whether additional evidence is required, and 
concludes that the statement alone may be sufficient. And that is it.131 
Many judges use Federal Courtroom Evidence132 as their desk 
reference for evidence issues. Although much more detailed and 
substantive than the Advisory Committee notes, Federal Courtroom 
Evidence does not provide meaningful guidance on the application of the 
excited utterance exception either. 
Federal Courtroom Evidence contains three subsections discussing 
the excited utterance exception.133 The first subsection is titled “Startling 
Event or Condition.”134 Regarding the nature of the event that qualifies for 
the exception, this subsection provides the following helpful instruction: 
“In addition to deciding whether the event took place, the judge must 
determine whether it was startling.”135 The only illumination that the 
manual provides regarding how the judge should decide whether an event 
was sufficiently startling is that the “presence of blood from an accident 
or assault seems to lead to an automatic conclusion of excitement.”136 In 
the absence of blood, applicability of the excited utterance exception 
depends on “the court’s assessment of the shock value of the event in 
question on the declarant.”137 
The second subsection is titled “Personal Perception,” and it 
discusses the requirement that the declarant have personally observed the 
startling event.138 The final subsection is titled “Under the Stress of 
Excitement.”139 It instructs judges that, “[f]or this exception to apply, the 
court must be able to find that the declarant’s state of mind at the time of 
making the declaration ruled out the conscious reflection essential for 
fabrication.”140 It explains that the rule “does not require that the 
declarant be completely incapable of deliberative thought at the time 
he or she made the statement.”141 Rather, “[a]ll that the exception 
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requires is that the statement be made contemporaneously with the 
excitement resulting from the event.”142 
Regarding the time period over which “the excitement from the 
event” persists, the manual is similarly unhelpful. It notes that, “[n]o 
particular period of elapsed time is decisive. The crucial point is that the 
court must be able to find that the declarant’s state at the time of making 
the statement ruled out the possibility of fabrication.”143 The only 
nuance the manual provides is that, “[p]hysical factors, such as shock, 
unconsciousness, or pain, may prolong the period in which the risk of 
fabrication is reduced to an acceptable minimum.”144 
This discussion of Federal Courtroom Evidence’s treatment of the 
excited utterance exception is not an indictment of the manual. Rather, the 
entire legal system largely ignores the scientific data regarding people’s 
tendencies and abilities to perceive and fabricate in the minutes, hours, or 
days following a startling event. Judges are left to make these assessments 
based on their intuition. 
III. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE 
EXCEPTION 
The excited utterance exception has not escaped criticism from 
scholars. Indeed, criticism of the excited utterance exception is not new. 
In 1928, Yale’s Dean Hutchins and Dr. Slesinger wrote, “On psychology 
grounds, the rule might very well read: Hearsay is inadmissible, especially 
(not except) if it be a spontaneous exclamation.”145 They based this 
opinion in part on their recognition of the perception problems of excited 
declarants.146 
Numerous scholars since have criticized the excited utterance 
exception as inconsistent with what psychologists believe to be the human 
capacity to fabricate while under emotional stress. Aviva Orenstein 
included a section in her article on the excited utterance exception titled, 
“The Psychological Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception,” in 
which she noted that the time to lie is measured in seconds, not the thirty 
minutes that courts often use as a default window.147Angela Conti and 
                                                     
 142. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 143. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 144. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 145. Donald Slesinger & Robert M. Hutchins, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 
COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928). This article has been frequently quoted or cited, including in the 
Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 803(2). 
 146. Id. at 438. 
 147. Orenstein, supra note 23, at 178. 
2017] The Excited Utterance Paradox 131 
Brian Gitnik criticized the excited utterance exception in 1999 as contrary 
to psychological beliefs.148 
A number of other scholars recommend abolishing the excited 
utterance exception. For example, James Donald Moorehead wrote in 
1995 that all of the res gestae exceptions should be abolished because such 
statements are not sufficiently reliable to forego cross-examination in open 
court.149 Alan Williams reached the same conclusion based on both the 
courts’ struggles to apply the exception consistently and on the science 
suggesting that lies are frequently spontaneous.150 
In none of these articles, however, did the authors dig deeply into the 
scientific evidence. Instead, most provide a relatively high-level 
conclusion that science does not support the exception. Michael Saks and 
Barbara Spellman, two law professors with psychology degrees, took a 
deep dive into the science behind many rules of evidence in their excellent 
recent book, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law.151 
Although the excited utterance exception occupies only a small portion of 
their book, the authors recognize both the doubtful nature of Wigmore’s 
presumption that startled declarants cannot fabricate and the impairment 
on perception that startling events can cause.152 They conclude that excited 
utterances are “not as reliable as the law thinks.”153 
IV. SCIENCE VS. THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
In light of the courts’ inconsistent application of the excited utterance 
exception and the paucity of legal scholarship collecting and describing 
the relevant science, this Section will attempt to describe in some detail 
the physiology and psychology of human reaction to startling events. 
The primary assumption underlying the excited utterance exception 
is that a person’s spontaneous statement about a “startling event” made 
while in the state of excitement prompted by those events is so trustworthy 
that we can forego the safeguards attendant with live testimony designed 
to detect dishonesty or misperception. From a more scientific point of 
view, this seemingly simple assumption rests on three main hypotheses: 
1. A startling event reliably produces a state of excitement; 
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2. That state of excitement interferes with the individual’s ability to 
deceive; and 
3. That state of excitement simultaneously neither distorts the 
individual’s perception of the startling event nor impairs the individual’s 
ability to organize the resulting perceptions into congruent and coherent 
spontaneous statements. 
This Section will examine whether the scientific literature supports 
these three key hypotheses. Specifically, it will apply scientific knowledge 
about the “fight-or-flight response” to the excited utterance theory, first 
giving an overview of how humans respond physiologically and 
psychologically to startling events. Next, it will focus more precisely on 
the science about how those reactions affect an individual’s inclination or 
ability to lie. Finally, it will describe how the fight-or-flight response 
affects perception of startling events and the ability to use language 
effectively to convey those perceptions while in a state of excitement. As 
this Section demonstrates, reactions to startling events are immensely 
complex and variable, and are not susceptible to simple generalizations or 
lists of factors. 
A.  A State of Excitement: The Fight-or-Flight Response 
For more than a century, science has generally supported Wigmore’s 
first hypothesis—that people do typically respond to startling events with 
a “state of excitement.” The “fight-or-flight response,” as the American 
physiologist Walter B. Cannon first named this state of excitement in 
1915, describes the changes that occur in the nervous system and body in 
the event of a perceived threat to safety or survival.154 Cannon and 
contemporary scientists observed a predictable pattern of bodily responses 
that occurred rapidly, powerfully, and automatically in both humans and 
other animals in response to perceived threats.155 Because of the near 
universality of this chain of reactions even across species and because of 
their obvious protective value, the scientists concluded that this fight-or-
flight response is likely inborn.156 They discovered that a cascade of 
responses is triggered first in the nervous system and then spread by the 
hormone system, with the purpose of optimizing an organism’s ability to 
take immediate protective or defensive action.157 These physiological 
changes have been extensively studied in the intervening decades and the 
findings are summarized below. This discussion will provide helpful 
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background for understanding the more targeted science on deception and 
perception while in a state of excitement. 
1.  The Physiology of the Fight-or-Flight Response 
Human beings, like other organisms, gather information about their 
environment through their sensory organs, like eyes, ears, and skin, and 
send the information over nerve pathways to the brain for processing.158 
Stimuli suggestive of a threat get special treatment: they are routed to the 
amygdala, a primitive structure deep in the brain that helps detect danger 
and process emotion.159 The stimuli are also simultaneously sent to the 
neocortex, the thinking part of the brain, but the neocortex engages in more 
complex, and thus slower, processing—not ideal when emergency action 
might be required.160 
If the amygdala processes the stimuli as posing real and imminent 
danger, it alerts the hypothalamus, which then transmits messages using 
the sympathetic nervous system, including the pituitary and adrenal 
glands.161 The sympathetic nervous system triggers the release of 
adrenaline (also known as epinephrine) and other hormones.162 These 
alarm hormones affect multiple organ systems, spurring changes from 
normal “at rest” bodily functioning to enable quick and powerful 
protective action.163 For example, under the influence of adrenaline, heart 
rate increases dramatically, blood pressure shoots up, and the small 
airways in the lungs expand while breathing also becomes more rapid; 
these shifts speed delivery of blood, oxygen, and fuel to the large 
muscles.164 Storage areas in the body, like the liver and pancreas, 
simultaneously dump fats and sugars into the blood stream in order to 
provide an energy boost for maximal physical effort.165 The body’s 
cooling system adjusts to support the expected physical demands, leading 
to increased sweating and raising the hairs on the skin.166 Diversion of 
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blood from the skin toward the muscles may cause blanching, flushing, or 
both, alternating.167 At the same time, normal bodily processes 
unnecessary for dealing with an emergency come to a halt: hormones 
inhibit sexual response and stop digestive processes from salivation on.168 
Blood clotting also increases to reduce blood loss in the event of injury.169 
At the same time, hormones cause changes in the sensory systems. 
Vision is altered; pupils dilate to let in more light and improve visual 
capacity.170 If the threat is ambiguous or the location of safety unclear, 
peripheral vision and scanning increase; however, if there is a clearly 
identified threat, “tunnel vision” typically occurs, allowing intense focus 
on the specific danger.171 Hearing is also affected, leading to either 
hyperawareness of sounds or a serious blunting of hearing, likely related 
to a quick judgment about whether the sounds are providing useful 
information or serving as a dangerous distraction.172 The release of the 
body’s natural opioids also reduces awareness of physical pain to help the 
individual cope with possible injury.173 
Once the threat is resolved, or if additional cognitive processing 
overrules the amygdala’s initial determination and decides the threat is not 
serious, the body’s brakes—the parasympathetic nervous system—return 
the body to its normal homeostatic state, though more gradually than the 
emergency system was activated.174 On the other hand, if the threat 
remains ongoing, another branch of the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal 
axis will stimulate release of additional hormones, which act to keep the 
body’s “gas pedal” pressed down, maintaining bodily readiness to react 
with violent physical activity but without the full-alert readiness of the 
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initial response, allowing partial return to normal physiological 
functioning.175 Finally, although the general pattern of physiological 
response is fairly predictable, the degree of response varies with the 
perceived nature of the threat, as well as with characteristics of the 
individual experiencing it, affecting the level of arousal and how long it 
persists.176 
What Constitutes a Threat 
Because the fight-or-flight response is an inborn protection system, 
many of the types of stimuli that trigger it are preprogrammed and present 
from birth; these include threats that carried significant risk of bodily harm 
or death in the environments that humans evolved in.177 Human ancestors 
who could recognize them quickly and mobilize their resources to confront 
them gained an evolutionary advantage.178 These primitive cues include 
things that warn about the proximity of predators (including unfriendly 
humans), dangerous environmental conditions (e.g., storms, avalanches, 
and other natural disasters), dangerous situations (with risks of falling, 
drowning, being burned, etc.), and indications that harm has already 
occurred—and more may be coming—such as sudden pain, the 
appearance of blood or internal bodily tissue, or damage to limbs.179 
The stimuli include ones that are very specific, like the sight, smell, 
or sound of dangerous animals, as well as others that are more generic, 
such as loud noises or bright flashing lights.180 Though not all stimuli that 
trigger the fight-or-flight response involve an element of surprise, ones 
that involve elements of being abrupt, unexpected, and unfamiliar will 
trigger the response both more reliably and more strongly.181 
Characteristics that increase ambiguity or uncertainty, like darkness or 
fog, and movement or other changes, also amplify the effect of the trigger 
stimulus.182 
Direct threats to the individual evoke the fight-or-flight response, of 
course, but so do threats to one’s offspring because of the biological urge 
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to preserve one’s genes.183 Because humans rely on each other for safety, 
being isolated, threatened with loss of important relationships or group 
membership, or being denied access to essential resources like food, water 
and shelter, can evoke the fight-or-flight response as reliably as direct 
physical threats.184 Situations that pose even less direct threats can also 
stimulate the response, such as threats to pride and self-esteem or to 
hierarchical status, because of their ultimate implications for increasing 
risk of bodily harm or death.185 
Modern humans generally retain these hardwired stimuli as primary 
fight-or-flight triggers and acquire additional ones through experience and 
learning. Many of these stimuli are near universally recognized—the sight 
of a gun in the hands of a fellow subway passenger may trigger the same 
strong fear of imminent death that a saber tooth tiger behind the next tree 
did for a caveman.186 Other stimuli may affect a narrower group, like gang 
members learning that a certain color of clothing indicates danger.187 Note 
that many of the modern threats that evoke the fight-or-flight response 
pose psychosocial threats rather than physical ones, yet humans’ 
physiology remains wired for confronting primarily physical dangers.188 
2.  The Psychology of The Fight-or-Flight Response 
In conjunction with the physiological changes described above, the 
fight-or-flight response also initiates changes in psychosocial functioning, 
including emotion, attention and memory, perception, cognition, and 
behavior. Understanding these psychological effects of the fight-or-flight 
response is important background for evaluating the scientific evidence 
more specifically related to the validity of the excited utterance exception. 
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a. Emotion 
The fear system is the primary emotional system associated with the 
fight-or-flight response, occurring in response to a serious threat.189 Anger 
and aggression can be another part of the fight-or-flight response, either 
on its own or in conjunction with fear.190 Some individuals, particularly 
those who feel cornered or without adequate escape or attack resources, 
may go “numb” or feel emotionally blunted instead.191 
Though some people are able to regulate their emotional responses 
in fight-or-flight situations, primarily by reappraising the situation as not 
threatening or by deliberately suppressing at least outward emotion during 
the event,192 most individuals automatically experience the emotional 
responses that accompany the fight-or-flight response.193 They feel unable 
to shift or even moderate their emotions during immediate and strong 
threats.194 The degree of the experienced emotion may vary, though; for 
example, fear may range from wariness and apprehension to full-blown 
terror, and anger and aggression from irritation to fury.195 Emotions may 
be “pure” or mixed, or may occur in succession at different phases of the 
event.196 
Anxiety, an emotion related to fear but generally regarded as its own 
distinct category, may occur on its own, though it more frequently 
accompanies the other emotions.197 Ambiguity about the nature and degree 
of the threat tends to create and amplify anxiety, as does uncertainty 
regarding the adequacy of one’s resources and opportunities to counter 
it.198 In addition, some individuals are at risk for greater anxiety. 
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Individuals with high trait anxiety199 will typically respond with higher 
levels of anxiety, as will people already experiencing significant stress.200 
b. Attention and Memory 
Many aspects of attention and memory, which are considered 
primary cognitive processes, are affected by the fight-or-flight response. 
This section will focus largely on several areas of particular concern for 
the excited utterance: startle and surprise; working memory; and selective 
attention. This section will also look at how the fight-or-flight response 
affects the formation of new memories and the individual’s subsequent 
ability to access those memories. 
i. Startle and Surprise 
The human nervous system has evolved several systems to help 
mammals notice and respond to danger signals. This section will examine 
two systems of particular importance for the excited utterance: startle and 
surprise. Although Wigmore used the term “startling,” this section 
explains that, from a technical perspective, he likely meant surprising.201 
Startling, in the scientific sense, refers to an inborn, universal 
physiological reflex-like response that occurs at the level of the spinal cord 
or brainstem.202 It involves rapid, automatic, and strong behavioral 
responses.203 Because these responses occur without processing in the 
brain, they cannot be inhibited if unexpected. For example, if you touch a 
hot stove you believe to be cool, you will jerk your hand away, literally 
without thinking. If you touch it knowing it is hot, though, you may be 
able to suppress the startle response and keep your hand in contact even 
though it burns you. 
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Stimuli that trigger the startle response involve elements of being 
both sudden and unexpected, and of signaling imminent and serious harm; 
they include sudden pain or injury, sudden loud noises or bright lights, 
unexpected stimuli moving rapidly toward the face, abrupt loss of support 
(e.g., an unanticipated fall), and unexpected proximity to a possible 
predator (e.g., discovering a stranger in your house).204 Reflex startling 
probably does indeed preclude lying—but only for the tiny, undetectable 
fraction of a second before the information is transmitted to the brain for 
further processing. 
Surprise is the phenomenon more of issue in the excited utterance. 
Surprise is a not a reflex but an emotion that involves cognitive evaluation 
of something as unexpected.205 Something that startles you also surprises 
you—but a fraction of a second later after you have had time to “think” 
about it. The converse is not true though; something that surprises you did 
not necessarily startle you physiologically first. Surprise differs from 
startle in a variety of other ways too. It can be evoked by a greater variety 
of stimuli and also has an emotional valence.206 
It is also important to note that the excited utterance treats startling 
events as binary—they are startling or they are not—but surprise, unlike 
physiological startle, can vary in degree as well as valence. The more 
surprising the event, the higher the arousal of the ensuing fight-or-flight 
response is likely to be.207 
ii. Working Memory 
Working memory refers to the brain’s active information processing 
system.208 This system affects the sensory information and long-term 
memories an individual can attend to and manipulate for nearly every type 
of mental task, including interpreting new information, encoding and 
storing new memories, applying new or well-practiced skills, making 
judgments and decisions, and solving problems.209 It has particular 
relevance to how people respond cognitively to non-normal events, 
including the ability to lie and perceive events accurately, and so will be 
reviewed here in some detail. 
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Despite its name, working memory involves not just memory, but 
also attention and executive functions of the brain.210 Though there are 
several competing models of precisely how working memory is structured 
and operates, researchers generally agree that working memory is central 
to human cognition.211 There is also general agreement that, in contrast to 
long-term memory, working memory is a limited resource, though the 
capacity of working memory varies among individuals.212 Psychologists 
often refer to the amount of effort required to deal with the “stuff” on a 
person’s working memory desktop as “cognitive load.”213 
An analogy may be helpful for conceptualizing how working 
memory operates generally. Visualize the foundational structure of an 
individual’s working memory as akin to the work surface of an office 
desk.214 Some individuals have bigger desks and some have smaller ones; 
the size of the individual’s desktop will limit the amount of information 
that individual can readily “see” and either use or act on at any given 
moment.215 
What is on someone’s working memory desktop at any given 
moment is a mix of current sensory information from the environment, 
recently acquired information that the brain has placed in short-term 
memory, and previously “filed” information brought out of storage from 
long-term memory, as well as whatever cognitive tasks the individual is 
performing at the time.216 The mix of items on the working memory desk 
will vary from individual to individual, as well as from moment to 
moment, according to the demands of the tasks the brain is working on, 
characteristics of the immediate environment, and the individual’s 
resources.217 
In the same way that people can usually only attend to the top paper 
of a stack, so can people typically only attend to one chunk of complex 
sensory information or memories at a time. For example, if you are 
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concentrating on learning a phone number you are reading, you probably 
cannot be simultaneously memorizing an address printed on a piece of 
paper in the stack below it. An exception, though, occurs for skills or 
processes that have been learned and practiced to the point that they have 
become automatic and require little to no conscious thought to execute.218 
For example, beginning drivers must devote a large space of their working 
memory desk to every component skill and demand of driving—operating 
the accelerator and brake smoothly and at the right times; turning the 
steering wheel to maneuver around corners or obstacles, as well as make 
small adjustments to keep the car properly oriented in the correct lane; 
monitoring the positions and speeds of other cars on the road and 
anticipating any changes in these; using turn signals or windshield wipers 
effectively; and so on—but an experienced driver can skillfully operate a 
car along a familiar route without ever thinking consciously about these 
component tasks.219 In terms of our desk and papers analogy, think of the 
beginning driver as having to spread papers for each component task 
across the entire desk, but the experienced driver can adequately represent 
the complex but automated skills with a small sticky note that says “drive 
the car.”220 
iii. Selective Attention 
Selective attention refers to the ability to control where one’s 
attention is directed and how focused it is.221 The metaphor of a spotlight 
captures how selective attention functions and how it interfaces with 
working memory.222 A spotlight can be narrowly focused on just one item 
on the working memory desk, leaving the peripheral items easily accessed 
but temporarily in shadow/ignored, or the beam can be expanded to 
illuminate many items at once for a “big picture” view, but at the cost of 
making the light more diffuse and leaving details less clear.223 Individuals 
vary generally in their ability to use selective attention effectively, and 
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their abilities to use selective attention are affected by situational 
characteristics, including stress.224 
iv. Startling Events, Memory, and Flashbulb Memories 
While memory may not seem a critical component of the excited 
utterance because it concerns declarations about recent events, it can affect 
the accuracy of both the content of the declarant’s utterance and the 
recipient’s subsequent recall of the utterance. This section will give a 
general but targeted overview of how memory functions both during a 
startling event and subsequently. In particular, it will examine flashbulb 
memories and their implications. 
For an individual to utter something about a current event, he or she 
must first form a sensory memory and then make an effort to transfer it to 
short-term memory.225 Sensory memories are very brief, lasting a second 
or less, and even short-term memories fade quickly; if not transferred to 
long-term memory within twenty to forty seconds, short-term memories 
will be “lost” and can never be retrieved after that point.226 The transfer 
from short-term to long-term memory is an active process, not an 
automatic one, though it can occur outside of conscious awareness.227 
Whether the individual is aware or not, though, she is “editing” the content 
of the memory at each step of the process as she prepares it for storage.228 
Content may be further edited as it is recalled and repeated to self or 
others.229 
Most of the excited utterances of concern in legal matters likely 
involve the declarant’s recent long-term memories. They have thus already 
been subjected to some cognitive processing and the introduction of 
possible distortion. Although research on the latency that prevents 
significant contamination of recent memories is lacking, it seems 
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reasonable that the shorter the interval between the event and the utterance, 
the less chance there will be for contamination.230 
The memory of the recipient is also relevant for the eventual 
reliability of the excited utterance, though, and the timing and likelihood 
of contamination of the memory will vary considerably depending on the 
length of time and circumstances until the recipient first repeats the 
declarant’s utterance and in the interval between the first utterance and 
when it is presented in court. The considerable body of research on the 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony likely applies to these vicarious 
memories as well.231 
Startling events and the effects of the resulting fight-or-flight 
response affect memory around the event in several ways. First, 
information that is new, threatening, or otherwise emotionally powerful is 
more likely to be attended to and brought into short term memory so that 
it can be remembered—and more likely to be judged important enough to 
store in long-term memory.232 Second, a startling event that is especially 
sudden or upsetting may cause permanent loss of information held in 
short-term memory at the time of the event, by preventing it from ever 
being transferred to long-term memory.233 Individuals may recognize that 
they are missing those memories, or they may “fill in” missing details and 
believe they remember them.234 This finding suggests that utterances 
concerning information in the period just before the startling event should 
likely be considered less reliable. Finally, memories formed during 
extreme levels of stress are highly susceptible to bias and 
contamination.235 
In general, stress and arousal affect both the formation of new 
memories and retrieval of old memories, according to the Yerkes-Dodson 
law: simple memories are most likely to be formed accurately when 
arousal and motivation are high; however, arousal affects the accurate 
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formation of complex memories in an inverted-U shape.236 That is, both 
very low and very high levels of stress interfere with creating new 
memories and later recall, while moderate levels of stress create optimal 
levels for memory.237 For the excited utterance exception, this means that 
the declarant’s level of arousal and the complexity of the content of the 
utterance will affect the likely reliability of the memory and subsequent 
statement, and in ways not necessarily apparent to the recipient or a judge. 
In addition, memories of startling events are processed differently 
from other types of memories and are likely to be vivid and detailed.238 
These “flashbulb memories” are a subcategory of memories for 
episodes.239 Both people directly involved in an event and those who hear 
about it subsequently may form flashbulb memories.240 Under the 
influence of stress hormones, these memories are formed using different 
systems and brain structures than procedural or information-related 
memories, or even other kinds of episodic memories, and tend to be 
recalled in holistic fashion, much like a mental snapshot that includes 
many kinds of sensory detail.241 
The focus and content of the “snapshot” may vary according to what 
details are attended to based on level of threat and arousal, as well as other 
individual factors and situational differences.242 Thus, a bystander at a safe 
distance from a startling event like a robbery might have a flashbulb 
memory resembling a wide-angle snapshot that includes lots of 
unnecessary detail, like the clothes on a mannequin in a nearby store, while 
the “snapshot” memory of the victim might be a sharp-focus close-up of 
the assailant’s weapon that fails to capture important details like the face 
of the robber. 
Flashbulb memories have a curious disconnect: individuals’ 
confidence in the accuracy of their flashbulb memories tends to be 
unusually high—but the actual reliability is no greater than for memories 
of more mundane events over the same time period (which is to say, not 
so great after the first few minutes).243 Researchers who tracked and 
compared the flashbulb memories of adults for major events like 9/11 and 
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natural disasters consistently find this inconsistency between accuracy of 
the memory and confidence that it is correctly recalled.244 Thus, recipients 
of excited utterances may believe intensely, but incorrectly, that their 
memories of the excited utterance are complete and accurate, which could 
cause judges and juries to accord the hearsay statements unwarranted 
credibility. 
c. Perception 
Research is clear that the fight-or-flight response affects individuals’ 
perceptions of an event in ways that may increase the likelihood of 
mistakes.245 Because the amygdala prioritizes safety and survival, quick 
assessments and defensive judgments prevail over deliberate and thorough 
analyses.246 Thus, independent of reality, people are more likely to 
perceive threats, more likely to overestimate the degree of threat, and more 
likely to attribute ill-intent to others when they are experiencing the fight-
or-flight response.247 Because stereotypes and prejudices (consciously or 
unconsciously held) facilitate fast decision-making, individuals will also 
tend to rely on them more heavily to evaluate situations and the intents of 
others; these sorts of perceptual biases can also lead to errors in judgments 
and decision-making and in subsequent interpretations and memories of 
the event.248 
d. Cognition 
By their nature, the kinds of situations that provoke the fight-or-flight 
response—typically dynamic, unpredictable, time-sensitive, and high 
stakes situations249—place high demands on individuals’ higher-order 
cognitive resources.250 Cognition during the acute phase of a threat focuses 
on several critical tasks: appraisal of the nature of the threat, appraisal of 
the individual’s resources in dealing with the threat, generation of 
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solutions for escaping or otherwise combatting the threat, and decision-
making regarding the options for doing so.251 
From brain scans of individuals under stress, though, we know that 
the parts of the brain involved in processing complex information are less 
“online” during crises.252 In addition, because of the urgency necessary to 
respond to threats that trigger the fight-or-flight response, the brain 
prioritizes speed of processing, further limiting higher order processes like 
systematic decision-making.253 Thus, individuals often find it difficult-to-
impossible to use higher order cognitive skills during a threatening 
situation, which may limit their behavioral responses to ones that are 
automatic, habitual, or easy.254 For example, individuals tend to use broad 
generalizations, black-and-white choices, and stereotyping to guide 
judgments and to rely on habitual behavioral patterns or first-thought 
action plans rather than generating and evaluating a range of options to 
choose between.255 These mental shortcuts are known as heuristics.256 
e. Behavior 
As is obvious from the name, the two most recognized broad 
behavior patterns evoked by the fight-or-flight response are fighting or 
fleeing.257 Flight, which is the more common of the two options, may entail 
running away from the threat and/or escaping toward a place (or people) 
of safety.258 Similarly, fighting may be aimed against the threat or toward 
creating a pathway to safety.259 Although the body’s responses are best 
suited for actual physical fight-or-flight, research shows that individuals 
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may also or instead resort to symbolic or psychological forms of these 
behaviors, such as creating psychological distance, using words as 
weapons, or making threat displays (like brandishing a gun or making 
threatening gestures).260 
However, in the century since the response was first identified, 
research has revealed that the physiological changes associated with the 
body’s response to threats support other common behavior patterns in 
addition to fight or flight. In particular, research has confirmed that 
freezing, sometimes described as a “fawn” response, is often the first 
response to a possible threat, particularly when the threat is distant or 
uncertain.261 Additionally, a similar but distinct behavior pattern may 
occur later in the event when an individual judges that the threat is too 
great and there is no path for escape. In these situations, individuals may 
experience tonic immobility (also called the “fright” response)—a 
temporary but often complete “paralysis” of thought or action, or even 
actual collapse (e.g., fainting).262 Related behavior patterns may involve 
shielding (e.g., cowering or using hands or objects to protect vulnerable 
body parts), hiding, trying to “fade into the background” in some way 
(including “playing dead”), or diverting the aggressor’s attention.263 
Another well-documented behavior pattern, known as “tend and 
befriend,” is particularly common in women, for whom fighting and 
fleeing are less likely to be effective options and in whom the stress 
response stimulates release of another hormone, oxytocin.264 The tend and 
befriend pattern centers on protection and care of young and/or cultivating 
and enlisting social support, particularly from other women, as 
protection.265 In addition, interpersonal threats that result in stimulation of 
the fight-or-flight response may also result in patterns of submissive and 
placating behaviors, including efforts to defuse the situation, soothing, 
agreeing, or efforts at negotiation or reasoning.266 Attempts at defusing are 
more likely when individuals perceive themselves as physically 
mismatched with the peril, lower in the social hierarchy than the aggressor, 
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or skilled at obtaining safety through negotiating.267 This style of response 
is common among many of the victims in domestic violence situations.268 
Note that these patterns may explicitly include the use of deception for 
self- or other-protection. 
Because human beings are social animals, their behavior in the face 
of threat is often modified by the proximity of others.269 Thus, behavioral 
patterns when others are present or nearby may include protective actions 
directed toward others rather than, or in addition to, the self, ranging from 
sentinel behavior (e.g., shouting warnings) to actively aiding others (e.g., 
pushing to safety, shielding, or fighting on behalf of another), even at the 
risk of one’s own safety.270 Protective actions are most likely to be directed 
toward those for whom the actor feels responsible in some way, such as 
one’s own children, those in one’s protective custody, or individuals 
perceived as members of a vulnerable group or as part of a group to whom 
the actor also belongs.271 
People’s perceptions of the threat and their initial reactions are also 
affected by their proximities to others and their relationships to those 
others. For example, studies of real life crises and natural disasters have 
found that people are slower to recognize and respond to signs of a threat 
when they are with close family members than when they are alone or with 
strangers.272 Consistent with these findings, witness statements of people 
on holiday or at a recreational event with friends and family members 
when a terroristic attack occurred typically contain accounts that the 
witness perceived the event to be benign in nature, although it was in fact 
threatening. For example, when an audience member present with fellow 
Air Force members during the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting 
in 2015 described his reaction to the first shots fired his way, he stated 
“[t]o be honest, my first idea was fireworks.”273 Derick Spruel, whose 
friend and fellow airman Jesse Childress was killed in the shooting, 
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explained “I thought it was a prank at first. I feel real bad to say this, but I 
really tried to continue to watch the movie.”274 
Attachment psychology theorists explain this sort of reaction as 
stemming from the feelings of safety we derive from being with others we 
know and expect to protect us.275 
Individuals also take their cues for how to react by observing the 
behaviors of others. Seeing others running fast in the opposite direction or 
hearing screams of alarm, for example, can be potent triggers for flight.276 
Many mass panic stampedes seem to be caused by this phenomenon; for 
example, a panic in a crowd watching a soccer match in a Turin, Italy 
piazza, possibly triggered by a firecracker, resulted in more than 1,500 
people being trampled and injured, some seriously. One witness stated, 
“No one heard the bang . . . . The noise we heard was that of the crowd 
running and screaming, and so obviously we thought there had been an 
attack.”277 Alternatively, seeing others calmly continuing to go about their 
normal business may lead people to interpret a crisis as benign and thus 
fail to act promptly.278 For example, authorities noted that many of the 
vulnerable residents of Galveston who failed to evacuate before Hurricane 
Ike in 2008 may have been lulled into a false sense of safety by the 
presence of on-scene broadcasters, who apparently thought it was safe 
enough to remain.279 
3. Situational Differences 
In general, the greater, more direct, and more imminent a threat to an 
individual’s safety or survival—or, more precisely, the more an individual 
appraises a threat in those ways—the stronger the level of autonomic 
arousal will be.280 Arousal will also be stronger when individuals evaluate 
their resources and opportunities within the situation as inadequate in the 
                                                     
 274. Id. 
 275. See generally Jeffry A. Simpson, Attachment Theory in Modern Evolutionary Perspective, 
in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 115–40 (Jude 
Cassidy & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 1999). 
 276. ANTHONY R. MAWSON, MASS PANIC AND SOCIAL ATTACHMENT: THE DYNAMICS OF 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 235–36 (Kindle ed. 2012). 
 277. Sofia Lotto Persio, Turin: How a False Alarm Led to Mass Injuries During a Champions 
League Match Viewing, NEWSWEEK (June 5, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/turin-how-false-
alarm-left-more-1500-injured-during-champions-league-620910 [https://perma.cc/J8ED-W83D]. 
 278. Daniel Nilsson & Anders Johansson, Social Influence During the Initial Phase of a Fire 
Evacuation-Analysis of Evacuation Experiments in a Cinema Theatre, 44 FIRE SAFETY J. 71, 71–79 
(2009). 
 279. Willie Drye, Why Hurricane Ike’s “Certain Death” Warning Failed, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/09/080926-hurricane-ike-
evacuation.html [https://perma.cc/346W-7GPX]. 
 280. Randolph J. Paterson & Richard W. Neufeld, Clear Danger: Situational Determinants of 
the Appraisal of Threat, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 404, 404–16 (1987). 
150 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1 
face of the threat.281 Arousal strength is similarly affected by the degree of 
perceived threat to someone whom an individual is highly motivated to 
protect. 282 
Moreover, the role of someone in a traumatic situation will also 
typically affect the degree of arousal. Individuals can be participants—and 
participants can be either the initiators of the situation or victims—or 
bystanders/witnesses. Both roles and the various relationships between 
participants and bystanders affect arousal levels and behavior.283 The 
situation may occur between or in proximity to people who know one 
another or may involve strangers. 
Usually, someone directly involved in a traumatic situation will have 
greater autonomic arousal than a bystander will, and someone who is not 
directly involved but who identifies strongly with one or more of the 
participants will respond more strongly than a neutral bystander.284 These 
nuances all have implications for the trustworthiness of a particular 
declarant. 
4. Individual Differences in Arousal 
Individual differences also affect how easily or strongly the fight-or-
flight system is activated. Some of these differences are innate,285 while 
others are the result of early life experiences that predispose individuals to 
be more or less reactive.286 In addition, later learning experiences, direct 
or vicarious, affect nervous system reactivity, sometimes powerfully.287 
Learning can also affect which stimuli cause different levels of arousal; 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is an extreme example of how 
learning may affect both triggers and arousal strength.288 
Recent experiences with other threat-related events, whether 
experienced directly or vicariously, can also “prime” the fight-or-flight 
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response, allowing it to occur more readily or strongly, or in response to 
particular stimuli.289 For example, in the wake of the Boston Marathon 
bombings, many people experienced strong fight-or-flight reactions in the 
presence of abandoned backpacks, whether or not they had been present 
at the bombing.290 
These individual and situational variations are of particular note for 
the excited utterance exception. Because both objective features of an 
event and demeanor of the declarant are poor indicators of the declarant’s 
arousal level, it is likely difficult for an untrained observer to judge the 
declarant’s arousal level accurately without at least cursory knowledge of 
the declarant’s innate tendencies and personal history. 
5. Latency of the Fight-or-Flight Response 
The fight-or-flight response is activated rapidly and is typically 
perceived by affected individuals as happening instantaneously and 
globally.291 How long the response lasts depends largely on how long it is 
needed; there is no set period for which an individual will be aroused and 
then recover.292 Once a threat has passed, the parasympathetic nervous 
system acts to reverse the changes associated with arousal and return the 
individual to homeostasis.293 This system is sometimes known colloquially 
as the “rest-and-digest” system or the “feed-and-breed” system, for 
activities that are best carried out in the absence of threats. The 
parasympathetic nervous system operates more slowly than the 
sympathetic one; time is needed to remove the circulating stress hormones 
from the system and replenish resources used during the fight-or-flight 
response (which is why people often continue to feel “shaky” or “worked 
up” even hours or days after experiencing a traumatic event).294 
6. Demeanor and the Fight-or-Flight Response 
Because the use of the excited utterance exception partly rests on the 
ability of those hearing the utterance to distinguish whether an individual 
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is in fact experiencing a state of excitement, it is important to consider 
whether the effects of fight-or-flight activation are readily and reliably 
detectable without training. 
The classic expectation is that someone who is experiencing the 
fight-or-flight response will be visibly agitated, with scared, anxious, 
surprised, or angry facial expressions, obvious rapid breathing, sweating, 
and other visible indicators of the fight-or-flight response.295 Research 
shows, however, that most people are poor judges of whether other 
individuals are displaying genuine or faked emotions.296 Even people 
generally trained in emotional observation tend to be poor judges of 
whether demeanor is being faked without advanced training or use of 
equipment that facilitates detection of fleeting facial expressions.297 
Ordinary observers may make false negative errors too; that is, they 
confuse controlled or “blank” expressions and body language with lack of 
emotional reaction.298 During a crisis, individuals may suppress their 
emotions for protective reasons. Examples where these kinds of reactions 
are common include domestic assaults, where the victim may have learned 
that appearing frightened exacerbates the assault,299 in people pulled over 
by police who expect that looking polite or friendly will reduce the risk 
that a situation escalates, or in first responders who mask their emotions 
in order to better comfort victims.300 After a period of such emotional 
suppression, actual emotions may be expressed later when it seems safe to 
do so or when the individual can no longer muster the energy to suppress 
them.301 Other people respond to abnormal events with inappropriate 
affect; their behavior too is likely to be misinterpreted.302 
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B. Putting It All Together: How the Fight-or-Flight Response Affects 
Deception, Perceptual Errors, Communication, and, Ultimately, 
Reliability 
1. Deception 
Because the excited utterance exception rests most fundamentally on 
the hypothesis that people are unable to lie when experiencing the 
emotions of a startling event, the logical first step in evaluating its validity 
is to examine the research on whether people can lie spontaneously while 
under that kind of acute and severe stress. 
Unfortunately, the gold-standard controlled experiments that would 
best answer the question are neither ethically nor practically feasible; 
therefore, that level of directly relevant scientific evidence does not exist 
and likely never will. But useful evidence to answer this question can be 
culled from other sources, including controlled experiments of lying under 
lower levels of stress and arousal (such as while performing complex 
arithmetic or holding one’s hand in ice water), as well as from experiments 
of performance of different complex behaviors in high-stress simulations 
(e.g., military, medical, and aviation crises), and from observations of 
deception that occur in natural startling situations. 
This section will show that the short answer to the question, “Can 
people lie while in an excited state after a startling event?” is yes. In fact, 
to the extent that lying may be a useful or well-practiced protective 
behavior, it may even be a likely behavior in response to many threatening 
situations.303 The scientific evidence, though, will also show that a full 
answer to this question is longer and more complicated: individuals vary 
in their inclination and ability to lie while under stress, in the types of lies 
they tell while in an excited state, and in the sorts of conditions under 
which they are more or less motivated or able to lie. 
This section will open with a review of relevant general research 
about lying, including a working definition of lying, an examination of 
who lies (including developmental, cultural, and individual 
characteristics), and situational and individual factors that affect why and 
when people are more or less likely to lie. It will conclude with a more 
specific look at the science about lying while in an excited state. 
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a. Definition of Lying 
A lie is a statement the speaker believes to be untrue told with the 
intent of deceiving a target.304 Thus, when a magician says she is sawing a 
man in half, it is not lying because she knows the audience realizes it will 
be an illusion. If a young child says something untrue because of 
misunderstanding, that also is not lying, because the child’s intent is not 
to deceive. Telling a child that Santa Claus is a real person who will bring 
him gifts if he behaves well, however, is lying—the speaker knows the 
statement to be untrue and intends for the target to believe it. 
Although that definition of lying is simple and straightforward, lies 
are actually a complex phenomenon and can vary on many dimensions.305 
They can: 
1. Have different intents/motivations. Lies can be intended 
to obtain something desired, or to protect against a negative 
consequence. More specifically, they can be self-serving (also 
known as egoistic—like someone inflating his income or 
deflating his weight to seem more attractive on a dating site), 
prosocial (also known as other-oriented—like a doctor lying 
about a patient’s prognosis to prevent despair), antisocial (or 
other-harming—like falsely accusing a work rival of 
mismanagement simply to cause him harm), or some 
combination of the above.306 
2. Vary in magnitude of consequence. Lies may range from 
minor or low-stakes (like responding to a telephone inquiry of 
“How are you?” with “Fine,” when you are actually battling a 
cold) to serious or high stakes (like falsely blaming someone 
else for a serious crime).307 
3. Range in complexity and degree. Lies may involve 
fudging—slightly exaggerating or deceiving by omitting a 
minor fact—to creating a complex, detailed fiction.308 
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4. Vary in how false impressions are created. There are lies 
of omission and commission, lies that withhold relevant 
information or add distracting extraneous information to create 
or permit a wrong impression, and lies that involve falsely 
denying knowledge or pleading poor memory. “Half-lies” and 
other partial truths can have the same impact as a complete lie 
while being cloaked with true elements.309 
5. Finally, lies may morph from deliberate to mistaken. 
People may come to believe their lies, either quickly or over 
time.310 
For purposes of the excited utterance, the focus is primarily on a 
subset of the possible types of lies—spontaneous ones of commission that 
potentially have significant consequences. This subset, though, still 
encompasses a wide range of different kinds of lies, including a range of 
intents and degrees of seriousness. In addition, the exception sometimes 
includes part-lies of omission, where something true is uttered but 
additional known information that would change the impact of the 
statement is omitted,311 as well as wholly true statements intended to create 
deception through distraction or misdirection. It is useful to keep this 
complexity in mind when considering the possibility of lying under stress. 
b. Who Lies 
We are all Pinocchio; lying is a near universal behavior with a high 
rate of frequency. Studies of self-reported lying using diary reports 
commonly find that virtually all cognitively healthy adults lie, with the 
mean frequency of lying ranging from about 0.59 to 1.96 lies per day.312 
One large-scale study using retrospective recall of the previous twenty-
four hours found a similar mean number of lies but lower prevalence, with 
less than half of adults (just over 40%) reporting lying during the previous 
day, and a small percentage of individuals (about 5%) responsible for the 
majority of lies during that period—though nearly all the subjects reported 
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lying during the previous week.313 A study that used videotaped 
interactions between strangers found that 60% of the subjects lied at least 
once in the course of a ten-minute conversation and those 60% told three 
lies on average; the biggest liars told a dozen lies in ten minutes.314 
In any event, lying is universal and frequent but varies considerably 
in rate between individuals. It also varies in seriousness; the majority of 
lies are minor or prosocial, with most people reporting telling one or fewer 
significant lies per week.315 Among significant lies, several studies have 
found that protective lies are more common than lies told for gain.316 The 
important takeaways of this research for the excited utterance are that lying 
is a common protective tool, and that most people are capable of telling 
serious lies. 
The ability to lie develops early in life and the timing seems to be 
related to the level of cognitive development.317 Laboratory observations 
and experiments with young children subjected to strong temptations 
followed by self-report of their behavior find that young children yield to 
temptation at a high rate and may well lie about whether they did, 
particularly when they fear negative consequences for their 
misbehavior.318 Lying to avoid negative consequences or for personal gain 
develops in many children as early as two or three years of age and is 
almost universal by age four, though it may take children years to become 
skilled liars whose falsehoods are hard for adults to detect.319 Nonetheless, 
the early onset of the ability to lie is important to consider when weighing 
the use of hearsay statements by children in legal proceedings. 
As pretty much every parent discovers, lying is more common at 
some ages than at others. In general, the rate of lying is lowest at the 
youngest ages and increases through adolescence when it typically reaches 
its lifetime peak.320 The frequency of lying then declines over the course 
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of adulthood and returns to about the same level as during the preschool 
years after the age of sixty.321 
The probability that a given individual will lie in a given 
circumstance is influenced partly by experience. Frequent liars are more 
likely to lie again; lying is like other skills and habits in that practice 
strengthens it. A recent study shows that telling small lies actually creates 
changes in the individual’s brain (specifically in the amygdala) which 
increase the likelihood that he or she will tell more, and bigger, lies in the 
future—a sort of neural slippery slope for lying.322 The chances of lying 
are also influenced by the individual’s learning about the rewards and risks 
of lying or telling the truth, and by their experiences with getting caught—
or getting away with lying.323 
Lying is also affected by cultural and subcultural norms that define 
circumstances when lying is expected—or unacceptable. For example, 
certain groups and subcultures may see lying to authorities as reasonable 
(or even demanded) to protect one another (e.g., “honor among thieves” 
and “brotherhood” loyalty among fraternity members),324 and police may 
see lying as honorable to protect one another (i.e., the “blue wall of 
silence”)325 or to achieve what they believe to be justice (e.g., 
“testilying”).326 In the United States, lying is commonplace to the point of 
being generally assumed in situations where people are expected to put 
their best selves forward, such as in job interviews327 or on online dating 
sites328 but the degree of misinforming is generally small.329 Americans 
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also expect—and often forgive—a certain degree of lying by politicians, 
salespeople, and, yes, lawyers.330 On the other hand, lies told for personal 
gain that harm innocent people are almost universally considered 
unacceptable.331 
For purposes of the excited utterance, the important takeaways from 
this review of who lies are: a) lying is a universal and frequent behavior; 
b) most lying is minor, but the majority of people nonetheless tell some 
significant lies on a regular basis; c) there are significant group and 
individual variables that affect who is most likely to lie and when—but 
mostly these are not readily observable characteristics. 
c. The Decision to Lie 
i. Dual Processing Theory: A Social Cognitive Framework for  
Lying 
Whether or not to tell a lie in a given situation is often influenced by 
a number of variables and judgments. Social scientists have proposed a 
number of theoretical frameworks to guide understanding of the cognitive 
decision process.332 Though different researchers have emphasized 
different elements, most frameworks include the individual’s judgments 
of: a) the risks or rewards of being honest versus lying; b) the odds of 
avoiding detection; and c) the consequences of getting caught.333 
For example, suppose you accidentally bumped the car in front of 
yours while parallel parking. You are in a hurry to get to an important 
appointment, but you check and see that there is a small dent in the other 
car’s bumper. There is also a little rust near it, though, suggesting that it 
probably happened a while ago. While you are inspecting the dent, the 
owner of the car returns and asks you if there is a problem. At this point 
you have to decide whether to lie. 
Applying a rational lying-decision framework, you would weigh the 
benefits of being honest and admitting you bumped the car (e.g., it will 
make you feel good) with the risk of being honest (the other driver may lie 
and insist you pay for a repair of a dent you believe you did not actually 
cause). You will also consider the benefits of lying (you might make it to 
your appointment on time; you will not have to pay for repairs) and the 
risks of doing so (if you get caught, it would be embarrassing and could 
compound the consequences). You might glance around to see if other 
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people might have been watching and also consider whether you will be 
able to lie convincingly. After processing these variables, you will decide 
whether to lie. 
This framework presumes that lying is at least a quasi-rational 
process. This decision process obviously increases cognitive and 
emotional load and takes time. Sometimes, though, the decision to lie is 
made under time pressure or other stresses. Dual-processing theory 
proposes that deciding whether to lie is not always a quasi-rational 
process. Particularly in higher stress situations, people may skip the slow 
and systematic central cognitive processing approach and opt instead for 
a peripheral route that uses shortcuts like heuristics.334 In the example, you 
might quickly make a “satisficing” judgment—a heuristic that focuses on 
a speedy evaluation of a few key details and judgments for a good-enough 
decision.335 This judgment could go either way: you could focus on your 
self-concept as someone with integrity and decide to be honest or you 
could focus on your judgment that you caused no harm and lie—”Oh, just 
making sure I left you enough space to get out!” 
ii. Some Specific Variables that Can Affect the Decision to Lie 
Whether an individual uses a quasi-rational approach or a short cut, 
there are some known variables that influence the likelihood of lying in a 
particular situation. Substance use, fatigue, and social influences can affect 
the chances that people will lie, although not in a consistent manner. For 
example, use of alcohol and other psychoactive drugs that impair 
judgment, reduce inhibitions and increase risk-taking, or amplify 
grandiosity or a sense of entitlement can increase willingness to lie by 
decreasing fear of consequences for lying—or they can decrease the 
likelihood by reducing fear of negative consequences for telling the 
truth.336 Similarly, internal conditions like fatigue, substance-induced 
lethargy, pain, or illness can reduce the ability to resist the temptation to 
lie via a phenomenon known as ego depletion.337 Alternatively, lying can 
be less likely under ego depletion if the individual’s energy reserves are 
too depleted to fabricate a believable falsehood.338 Fatigue is a particularly 
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important variable to consider for the excited utterance exception because 
it is a common condition as the body starts to shift from the fight-or-flight 
response back to resting function. 
Similarly, social contagion refers to a tendency of the behavior of 
others in the vicinity to influence one’s own behavior. Lying appears to 
spread easily, especially if others appear to be benefitting as a result of 
lying or at least failing to be punished for it and if the lies are small or 
justifiable.339 On the other hand, being surrounded by people behaving 
honestly seems to inhibit the willingness to lie or cheat.340 
As well as having a bit of Pinocchio in us, we typically have a lot of 
Jiminy Cricket in us too. Most people are mostly honest most of the time—
especially about matters of consequence.341 The impulse to be honest is 
likely genetically ingrained, the result of an evolutionary advantage for 
those who could maintain a trusting social compact that allowed groups to 
live harmoniously.342 Explicit childhood training and the resulting 
pride/integrity and guilt/shame emotional systems serve to reinforce the 
inborn moral bent, even in the absence of specific rewards and 
punishments.343 Ironically, this tendency for honesty to be not just the best, 
but the most frequent, policy likely contributes to the typical person’s 
difficult in detecting lies; we expect people to be truthful because mostly 
they are. 
Internal moral compass notwithstanding, when temptation threatens 
to override an individual’s better angels, external reminders of 
consequences can affect the probability of honest behavior. Reminders 
that others are monitoring and/or that dishonesty will incur severe 
penalties make truthful statements more likely.344 Interestingly, reminders 
to behave with integrity, like requiring individuals to sign their names or 
raise their hands to affirm that their answers are truthful, or notices 
requesting that people behave honestly, can increase the likelihood of 
honesty to levels comparable to those achieved through warnings, threats, 
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and surveillance.345 The timing of the reminders and appeals matters, with 
those just prior to performance generally being more effective.346 
The implications of these findings for the excited utterance are that 
the conditions associated with live testimony, like promising to tell the 
truth, visible and auditory reminders of the consequences for perjury, and 
courtroom symbols of moral obligation like Lady Justice and the Bible, 
are likely to increase honesty—suggesting again that hearsay exemptions 
do sacrifice meaningful protections. 
d. Startling Events and Excited Lies 
Even if individuals are typically able to lie easily and frequently 
under low to moderate stress, that does not necessarily indicate that they 
will be able to do so in highly challenging circumstances, or that they will 
be able to do so well enough that others will not readily detect their lies. 
Accordingly, this section will look at the ability of people to lie following 
a startling event and draw on evidence from a range of sources, including 
laboratory experiments, parallels with other challenging tasks performed 
in startling situations, and a theoretical model of lying under stress and 
surprise. 
i. From Cain to “Alternative Facts” 
History abounds with Big Lies, told to get something, save face, or 
save someone’s skin. “Abel? Haven’t seen him.” “We have a nice big 
wooden horse for you as a gift!” “I am not a crook!” “I did not have sex 
with that woman!” “I have never had a single positive doping test, and I 
do not take performance-enhancing drugs.” “You’re saying it’s a 
falsehood. And…[he] gave alternative facts.” 
This list could go on and on. But most of these lies, though high 
stakes and told under stress, do not actually quite fit the excited utterance 
definition because the liar had a hiatus between the shock of discovery and 
the time to speak, time to get composed and dream up a fabrication. It is 
the added demand of telling a lie spontaneously in the wake of a startling 
moment that might make some lies extra tough—perhaps too tough. 
And yet…Ryan Lochte arrives at the Olympic Village in the early 
morning with a story about being robbed at gunpoint.347 Killers dial 911 to 
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report stumbling on homicides or accidents they actually committed.348 A 
teenager can’t imagine how that bag of pot ended up under his mattress. 
When the police pull her over for weaving along the street on her way 
home from a party, your neighbor insists she only had one glass of wine. 
Though these kinds of lies have received startlingly little attention 
from the scientific community, there is nonetheless plenty of anecdotal 
evidence that people do tell them. So how do they manage? 
ii. Lying and Stress in the Laboratory 
Laboratory research provides some support for Wigmore’s belief that 
lying does indeed require more brain structures and energy. Experiments 
show that: a) it often takes longer to formulate a lie than to tell the truth; 
b) lying is a more complicated cognitive task than telling the truth; and c) 
stress makes it even more difficult to lie. 
Laboratory experiments using precise measurement of response 
latency (how long it takes to start to answer) and functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) mostly find that lying is in general a slower 
task than being honest. For example, when subjects are instructed to lie in 
some circumstances and be truthful in others, it takes longer to answer 
when subjects have to lie.349 Similar studies with fMRIs have shown that 
lying requires activation of more and different parts of the brain than truth 
telling.350 Lying involves first activating the areas involved in telling the 
truth—but is followed by additional areas, as the liar carries out the 
additional cognitive components of lying, including deciding whether to 
lie, inhibiting speaking the truth, and creating a fiction.351 Most of the 
research agrees that lying puts significant demands on the deceiving 
individual’s working memory and executive functions—cognitive 
functions that are overtaxed when there is a startling event.352 
Laboratory studies show that the addition of moderate stress 
increases a liar’s working memory and cognitive load, making it even 
more difficult to lie. When subjects are directed to tell lies while or 
immediately after being stressed psychologically (such as by performing 
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difficult math problems) or physically (such as by holding their hands in 
ice water), their performance degrades as their cognitive load is increased 
(such as by manipulating consequences for quality of performance, 
increasing the time or severity of physical stress, increasing the number of 
choices, requiring more complex discriminations about when to lie or tell 
the truth, or increasing time pressure).353 With greater cognitive load, 
subjects make more errors (like lying under the wrong conditions, offering 
a different lie from what they were instructed to, or leaking the truth) or 
take longer to begin speaking.354 With greater load, subjects also often 
simplified their responses, offering fewer details and shorter 
verbalizations with simpler vocabulary and less complex grammar.355 
In the end, though, these experiments provide at best weak support 
for Wigmore’s theory. First, even under stress, subjects were still able to 
lie, even if it took them longer. Second, the time difference between telling 
the truth and a lie, while statistically significant, would be meaningless in 
real world conditions: in these studies, the time variations between true 
statements and lies are typically measured in thousandths of a second.356 
Discrepancies this brief go unnoticed by casual observers.357 In addition, 
differences in latency are relative within individuals; no universal latency 
indicates that a speaker is lying. 
These studies do confirm that lying is typically a more cognitively 
challenging task than telling the truth. In addition, because they involved 
simple falsehoods (like lying about the color of a card) under moderate 
stress, they leave unanswered questions about real world, high-stakes lies 
during actual startling events. 
iii. Challenging Task Performance Under Startling Events 
Pilots land suddenly disabled jetliners safely; surgical teams perform 
complicated surgeries under time pressure after something major 
unexpectedly goes very, very wrong; military teams carry out life-or-death 
missions in situations clouded with uncertainty and pocked with 
unplanned mishaps. Even completely ordinary people perform remarkable 
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feats when surprised and stressed: they improvise equipment and try 
strategy after strategy to save others’ lives under difficult physical 
conditions—like Joseph Kolanchick358 and thousands of other Carnegie 
Medal winners have done.359 Clearly, people are capable of performing 
highly complex tasks after being startled and faced with high-stakes peril. 
But can they lie under those conditions? 
Although studies of stress and stress simulations cannot directly 
indicate lying capacity, these studies offer insights on individual coping 
methods. To cope with startling events, individuals use: anticipation and 
preparation; rehearsal or practice of similar behaviors; reliance on habitual 
or recent behaviors, minimization of choices; and use of heuristics and 
other shortcuts.360 Many of these processes are ones that are used (though 
perhaps in less sophisticated or systematic ways) by ordinary liars. 
Anticipating situations where lying might be demanded makes later 
performance of lying easier in a couple ways. First, anticipation reduces 
surprise, which in turn reduces the emotional load. This facilitating 
mechanism is supported experimentally; research subjects who are warned 
that they will later need to lie generate lies faster and tell more elaborate 
ones than others who are prompted to lie at the last minute.361 Second, 
anticipation may enable a liar to prepare by fabricating a lie under lower 
cognitive load and even to rehearse lying and make subsequent 
adjustments to content or delivery. In one laboratory experiment, both 
instruction to try to lie faster and training on how to lie quickly improved 
response time for lying, relative to a control group.362 The training group 
also improved their performance on lying correctly (i.e., lying under the 
target condition and not lying under non-target conditions).363 In another 
experiment, liars who had opportunities to prepare and practice their lies 
were less likely to be detected.364 
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People often mentally prepare and rehearse lies for commonly 
encountered situations where lying may be advantageous (e.g., “The dog 
ate my homework!” “Your new haircut looks great!”); it is likely that 
people who are risk-takers prepare, and may even practice, for lying in 
high-stake, high arousal situations (e.g., “I swear I only had one drink, 
Officer,” or “Honey, I just happened to run into my old girlfriend and she 
asked me to have a drink; it wasn’t anything more than that.”). 
Strategies that minimize choices also make it easier to lie in 
demanding circumstances. Keeping the lie close to the actual truth and 
only changing a key variable is a common strategy. Liars can also stick to 
easily-accessed content in their memories, for example, by repeating a 
recent lie or a successful lie.365 People can also avoid the need to fabricate 
content by “borrowing” their lies, like using stories they have encountered 
from others or through media; individuals with extensive and frequently 
used “story banks” may be able to retrieve appropriate long-term 
memories relatively easily. In addition, most people have heuristic, 
multipurpose “autolies” –like “Not my fault!” or “No, I didn’t!” 
Finally, there is evidence that lying is not invariably a more 
challenging cognitive task than telling the truth. For example, when the 
truth is complex or fuzzy, when the speaker is highly motivated to be 
accurate and thorough, when it is necessary to adjust the communication 
for a given listener, or when the speaker has mixed feelings about being 
truthful versus lying, deciding to be honest can create greater cognitive 
load than simply telling a short and simple lie. 
iv. The Goldilocks Theory: People Lie After a Startling Event When 
it’s the Just-Right—or Good-Enough—Option 
If instead of escaping out the window, Goldilocks had been cornered 
by the trio of talking carnivores who startled her awake, there is a good 
chance she would have resorted to lying to protect herself. “Look over 
there! It’s the Wicked Witch!” “I’m so sorry! I thought this was my 
granny’s house!” “You don’t want to eat me! I have mad cow (bear?) 
disease and you’ll get infected if you have even one bite!” 
According to the social-cognitive framework used to predict a 
decision to lie discussed above,366 deciding to lie would be a rational 
choice for someone in a high threat situation like this one with few better 
defensive options. Goldilocks would have multiple motivations to lie—to 
protect herself from getting eaten, being punished by her parents, or going 
to juvenile court. The chances of getting caught lying are likely low—
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mostly people get away with lies.367 And in any event, she has little to 
lose—if she does not lie, she probably gets eaten, if she does lie, maybe 
she escapes. And finally, we can feel confident that a junior burglar and 
vandal like her has the ability to lie well within her wheelhouse. Fibbing 
will probably be one of the first options that comes to mind once she is 
confronted. 
More likely, though, Goldilocks will decide to lie in this situation 
without even going through a rational analysis. The dual processing model 
suggests that this situation—high-stakes, time-pressured, and trapped—is 
one where the decision to lie—and the decision about which lie to tell—
will occur more or less automatically without thorough consideration of 
alternatives or longer term consequences. Instead, heuristics will come to 
the rescue. Common lies used in no-time-to-think-must-act scenarios 
include “distract” (the Wicked Witch option), “deny wrongdoing” (the 
granny’s cottage option) and “imitate success” (the mad cow option). 
In the end, Goldilocks’s choice may prove to be less than optimal, 
but that would not be surprising either. Because in these conditions, people 
make mistakes. And that brings us to the next, and more likely, source of 
error in excited utterances. 
2. Mistakes 
 
In 1981, Jerry Parr, President Reagan’s Special Agent in Charge, was 
on duty during the assassination attempt.368 Shots rang out at close range 
as Reagan and his entourage left the venue where the president had been 
speaking—a clear startling event for everyone present.369 Parr shoved the 
president into the waiting limousine and scrambled in after him, directing 
the driver to go.370 Shortly after departing the scene, Parr made a statement 
that could obviously be classifiable as an excited utterance: “Rawhide 
[Reagan] is okay!” and directed the limousine to return to the White 
House.371 
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His utterance was not a lie—but it was completely wrong. Reagan 
was not okay.372 No one, including Reagan, realized he had been shot.373 
After a few moments, it became obvious that Reagan had some injuries—
sore ribs and bleeding from his mouth—but it took longer before anyone 
in the limo realized that Reagan’s injuries were not minor—that the 
discomfort he was experiencing in his side was not caused by being shoved 
into the vehicle, and that the blood coming from his mouth was not from 
a cut lip, but that both were caused by a bullet hitting the president’s rib 
and puncturing his lung.374 
Imagine if John Hinckley, Jr.’s attorney had been able to introduce 
this statement as evidence that his client did not harm the president, that 
his injuries must have been incurred subsequently to his client’s actions? 
Though Wigmore’s theory focused on lying as the behavior likely to 
make an utterance unreliable, as the example above demonstrates, there 
are other ways an excited utterance can be untrue: through mistakes in 
perception and cognition. The fact-finder’s lack of opportunity to assess 
the witness’s accuracy—through cross-examination and observation of the 
witness’s demeanor—is another significant problem with the excited 
utterance exception. This section will show how high stress can increase 
the likelihood of misperception in ways that affect the reliability of excited 
utterances and countenance against admitting them into evidence. 
Just as characteristics of combat situations like noise and other 
intense stimuli can produce “fog of war” confusion,375 comparable 
conditions in more mundane startling events lead to misinterpretations of 
reality. The misstatements about what happened that occur in these 
confusing situations are not lies—they are not told with the intent to 
mislead—but they are just as untrustworthy and unlikely to advance 
justice in a courtroom as deliberate deception. 
Most perceptual errors happen automatically, outside of conscious 
awareness or control. They tend to be experienced as “real” and not as an 
effort to adjust reality, and they often persist or, frequently, become 
compounded, over time.376 
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Certain perceptual and cognitive processes are particularly likely to 
be sources of error during startling events because of their tendencies to 
be used as shortcuts for decision-making under time pressure and high 
cognitive load.377 Some of the more common perceptual errors are: 
1. Closure. Humans’ brains are pre-programmed to “fill in 
the blanks” when information is missing.378 If, for example, 
observers’ views were obscured or competing noise made them 
unable to hear something clearly, their brains will automatically, 
and often out of conscious awareness, fill in the missing 
information. 
2. Stereotyping, Priming, Halo Effects, and Other 
Expectation Biases. These are universal heuristic errors that lead 
people to “see” what they expect or perhaps hope to see. 
Stereotyping refers to automatic judgments of certain groups or 
situations; they can be favorable or unfavorable and can powerfully 
bias perception.379 The Trayvon Martin shooting highlighted 
common stereotypes about young black men—and showed how 
those stereotypes could influence perception; George Zimmerman 
was sure he “saw” a gun in Martin’s hand, but it was a bag of 
Skittles.380 Priming refers to the tendency of recent experiences 
(direct or vicarious) to influence near-future interpretations.381 Halo 
effects are similar to stereotyping, but are attached to a particular 
individual rather than a group, in that one’s global evaluation of 
someone can influence how other actions by that same individual 
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are perceived.382 Finally, people may have come to expect an event 
to play out a certain way or others to react in a particular fashion as 
a result of prior experiences or training; these expectations affect 
what they notice or how they interpret contrary information. 
3. Perceptual Tunneling, Weapon Focus, and Other 
Attentional Biases. Alterations in attention during the fight-or-flight 
response affect what sensory information is detected, given weight, 
and remembered even moments later.383 Perceptual tunneling may 
stem from visual tunneling (when a visual field is limited to a 
narrow area of concern), resulting in an inability to describe 
anything beyond that field because one simply never even noticed 
it, or it may be the result of what one decides to concentrate on.384 
4. Knowledge Biases. Knowledge relevant to a particular 
event can contribute dramatically to what is noticed or missed, and 
how the information is interpreted. Footage of family members and 
school children watching the tragic launch of the Challenger space 
shuttle reveals this phenomenon vividly.385 Those with less 
knowledge about normal shuttle launches appear unconcerned or 
mildly confused when there is a small explosion and smoke appears 
as the shuttle ascends and reaches another stage.386 The faces of 
NASA workers and others with more experience, though, show 
they instantly understand that tragedy has occurred.387 Another 
common knowledge bias occurs with recognition of faces of people 
whose racial background differs from the viewer’s; most people are 
less able to describe or remember facial features, hairstyle details, 
and other characteristics of people from a race not their own.388 
5. Attribution Error. Attribution error refers to the near 
universal tendency to place blame for others’ poor behavior on their 
own internal characteristics and intentions, while tending to see 
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external events or circumstances as largely responsible for one’s 
own missteps.389 
6. Cognitive Dissonance. Cognitive dissonance happens 
when what one believes is at odds with what one perceives (or 
does). This creates an uncomfortable state that the mind corrects by 
either changing beliefs or by deciding one’s perception is wrong. 
Because belief and attitude changes are generally complex and 
lengthy processes occurring after many contrary experiences, 
disbelieving the correctness of one’s perception is the more likely 
response to this kind of discrepancy.390 
7. Cognitive Models. Cognitive or mental models are 
acquired global mindsets about complex situations that are used to 
guide expectations, judgments, and decisions while a situation 
unfolds. In some cases, these models may cause exaggerated or 
false perceptions of threats, even triggering or amplifying fight-or-
flight reactions unnecessarily.391 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
for example, often involves the operation of cognitive models about 
potentially threatening situations or stimuli.392 Likewise, possessing 
a weapon can create a cognitive model that leads to the perception 
of danger and the assumption that others’ intents are threatening.393 
8. Anchoring. The order in which information is presented 
affects the likelihood that it will be attended to, remembered, or 
interpreted as important. In general, information at the beginning 
and end of an event will act as anchors, and be remembered as more 
significant than information in the middle.394 
Obviously, these kinds of perceptual errors can affect all participants 
and witnesses to an event. The reason that they are important for the 
excited utterance exception is two fold. First, many kinds of perceptual 
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errors are more likely in the “startling” situations that invoke the exception 
than in other calmer situations. Thus, the frailties of eyewitness 
perceptions are exacerbated under the excited state that is the premise of 
the excited utterance exception. Second, the excited utterance exception 
admits out-of-court statements without the normal safeguards of the trial 
process—cross-examination and the opportunity for the fact finder to 
observe the witness. These safeguards protect against not only deliberately 
deceptive testimony, but also well-intentioned but inaccurate testimony. 
3. Miscommunications 
Finally, the subtler “utterance” component of the excited utterance 
exception is often overlooked in discussions of whether excited utterances 
are sufficiently reliable to be automatically admitted in court. Startling 
events may not only affect a declarant’s ability to deceive or the accuracy 
of their perceptions but could also interfere with the communication of an 
utterance. 
In terms of communication, there are two primary sources of error: 
the declarant and the recipient. There has been relatively little research on 
how acute stress affects spontaneous communications, but this section will 
examine some of the issues around the ability of a surprised and stressed 
declarant to frame and express an utterance. It will also present findings 
of a preliminary exploration of excited utterances in natural situations 
captured on video and offer suggestions for future research. Second, it will 
examine factors that could affect the recipient’s ability to absorb, 
remember, and later repeat the utterance accurately. The role of the 
receiver (who will later pass along the utterance) has been particularly 
ignored as a possible source of additional and unique error in excited 
utterances. 
a. Speaker Issues 
Even if an individual has been sufficiently startled by a stressful 
event such that the individual is unable to lie, and even if that individual 
was able to accurately perceive the event despite the stress, the individual 
may or may not be able to communicate adequately. Oral communication 
imposes additional and unique cognitive load, activating additional areas 
of the brain and requiring coordination with other cognitive tasks. 
To utter a coherent, reality-anchored statement, the individual’s 
sensory impressions must be encoded into language, “packaged” to match 
vocabulary and syntax to the needs and abilities of the intended target, and 
delivered. All while so emotionally overwrought as to be unable to 
fabricate. 
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Research on communication under high levels of stress is fairly 
limited. There is evidence, though, that speech production is affected by 
high levels of emotion.395 The length of utterances tends to be shorter, and 
the structure and vocabulary less complex.396 Studies of teamwork in crisis 
situations, like in aviation accidents, show that speaker communication 
errors are common and varied, affecting the timeliness of 
communications, the completeness and adequacy of communications, the 
reading of nonverbal cues, as well as any errors caused by failure to 
communicate when needed.397 Research pays even less attention to the 
semantic content of what people verbalize or to the temporal aspects of 
utterances. But at a minimum, given the effects on vocabulary and 
sentence complexity, it is reasonable to assume that utterances will be less 
detailed and less precise or nuanced. 
Because of the paucity of formal evidence, this section will include 
some tentative and preliminary suggestions of how speech content and 
timing are affected by real life startling events. These suggestions are 
based on an anecdotal review of dozens of traumatic events and 
emergencies captured on videotape and retrieved from YouTube, as well 
as review of 911 calls from events like the Pulse nightclub attack in 
Orlando. Examined footage includes well known incidents, such as the 
assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981, the Challenger 
explosion in 1986, the 9/11 terror attack in 2001, the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing, and the 2016 Bastille Day truck attack in Nice, 
France, all of which involved multiple victims and multiple witnesses and 
most of which were captured on video from multiple vantage points. Also 
examined were: dash- and bodycam videos; bystander or participant 
cellphone videos from several notorious police shooting incidents, such as 
the Philando Castile shooting in Minnesota, the Samuel DuBose shooting 
in Ohio, and the Keith Lamont Scott shooting in North Carolina; and 
amateur video of multiple airshow and auto race accidents.398 These were 
“balanced” with assorted home videos of trampoline accidents and other 
backyard stunts gone wrong.399 
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This examination suggests that there are some typical patterns of 
vocalized responses to startling events, though utterances are affected by 
variables like magnitude of the event, the role of the speaker in the event, 
the length and pace in which the event unfolds, the degree of surprise, and 
the speaker’s distance, physically, emotionally, and temporally, from the 
“action.” 
The first seconds after the realization of a crisis often precluded true 
speech, particularly by those most directly affected or nearest the action. 
Frequently, the first vocalization was not speech, but a sharp intake of 
breath. This sort of response was often followed by apparently stunned 
silence or nonverbal vocalizations like cries and screams, gasps, grunts, 
occasional simple one-word exclamations like “Oh!” or “No!” In the most 
extreme events and among those most directly affected, these nonverbal 
vocalizations continued for the duration of the event and even beyond, as 
if the event had not only stilled reflective capacities but robbed those 
involved of speech altogether. 
After more time or with greater distance, vocalizations still were 
typically not speech so much as general exclamations—“Oh no!” “Good 
lord!” “Oh my God!” or swearing. Particularly when the situation involved 
a young male being filmed doing stupid things in the backyard, there might 
be inappropriate laughter. If the threat was uncertain and the bystander 
was at a safe distance, there were sometimes more narrative utterances, 
though typically these were short, simple statements or questions, couched 
with uncertainty: “That doesn’t look good,” or “Is that supposed to 
happen?” In other cases though, early utterances often included short 
warnings and commands—“Run!” “Help!” “He’s got a gun!” “Call 911!” 
For events where a lead-up to the incident occurred and was 
captured, there were sometimes threats, warnings, or requests by 
participants and bystanders before the peak of the incident—e.g., “Put the 
gun down!” “Don’t shoot!” “He won’t hurt you!” etc. Overall, the 
emotional tenor of statements by both victims and witnesses was negative 
and consistent with the kinds of emotion evoked by the fight-or-flight 
response—with fear predominating and anger second, unless the speaker 
was obviously confused or uncertain about the nature of the incident. 
Transcripts of calls made to 911 during the 2016 Pulse nightclub 
terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida, showcased some interesting features 
of communications in the midst of a drawn-out extreme event.400 First, 
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action preceded communication; callers did not dial 911 until they got to 
a safe place.401 Second, the content and quality of their communications 
appeared impaired by the stress and confusion.402 Callers were often 
unable to provide even fairly basic information they likely once knew 
(such as the name or location of the club).403 In addition, their 
communications were typically disjointed and disorganized, with critical 
facts omitted or presented in a confusing order; dispatchers typically had 
to ask clarifying questions.404 Characteristics of the situation also affected 
the quality of their utterances; for example, callers who voiced fear of 
being located by the shooter whispered, impairing the dispatchers’ ability 
to hear, and used short, choppy utterances.405 Higher levels of 
physiological stress also impaired communication ability; individuals who 
had been shot or otherwise injured often had to hand the phone to someone 
else.406 
In summary, this anecdotal review suggests that the variables that 
influence ability to deceive or likelihood of mistakes also affect the quality 
and content of utterances related to the event. 
b. Recipient Issues 
The recipient’s task is also complex and may be affected by the 
degree to which the recipient was also directly exposed to the startling 
event or was vicariously “infected” by transmitted stress. The recipient has 
to absorb a message transmitted by someone experiencing high stress (and 
likely speaking in the disorganized and choppy manner that stress 
induces), often still in a distracting environment that makes it hard to hear 
clearly. The recipient likely has to split attention between expressing 
concern for the speaker and accurately receiving the message while 
simultaneously suppressing distractions in the environment. The recipient 
must then hold the message in short-term memory along with possible 
additional new concerns resulting from the incident before transferring the 
message to long-term memory, while also avoiding contamination of the 
message with statements from others and the recipient’s own memories 
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and emotions. That memory must then be stored in long-term memory 
unchanged by the effects of interim retellings and questioning and any 
emerging information about the incident, and then finally be retrieved as 
a good facsimile of the original message at a later—often much later—
date without incurring significant decay or distortion. Recipients who were 
not directly present also have the additional challenge of having to create 
and access the memory minus the benefit of sensory and motor cues that 
are helpful for accurate encoding, storage, and retrieval. 
Imagine playing a game of telephone where the first person 
experiences a major trauma, passes the message to the next person within 
the next half hour, more or less, and then that person passes it along a year 
or two later. It seems probable that that game will result in even less 
accurate transmission of the intended message than one that passes 
through multiple conduits at a birthday party—with none of the hilarity. 
The excited utterance exception does not depend explicitly on 
whether the recipient of the utterance believed the declarant (because of 
the presumption that the statement must be true). Consideration of whether 
the utterance is truthful by the person who passes it along may be an 
informal filter that could screen out some false statements that manage to 
be uttered despite the relative difficulty of lying under stress, thus 
increasing confidence in the trustworthiness of the hearsay exception. 
C. The Excited Utterance Paradox 
People utter untrue things under stress all the time. Sometimes they 
do so deliberately to deceive, sometimes they do so inadvertently because 
of mistakes of perception or communication. Why and how they do so, 
though, is largely irrelevant when the ultimate question is whether excited 
utterances are so inherently reliable that they need not be subjected to the 
usual safeguards of live testimony. And the answer seems to be that 
excited utterances do not meet that high standard. 
One intriguing thesis that emerged from reviewing the literature is 
what might be called the Excited Utterance Paradox: when the levels of 
arousal are so high that an individual is unable to tell even a moderately 
detailed and plausible lie, his perception is likely so distorted that he makes 
mistakes in understanding reality and/or in communicating his 
impressions. But when arousal is low enough to facilitate more accurate 
perception and effective communication, it is also low enough to reduce 
the cognitive load that interferes with fabricating a lie. There may well be 
a theoretical sweet spot of arousal where perception is accurate and lie-
telling is challenging, but that would be a difficult discernment for an 
ordinary bystander or judge to detect. 
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CONCLUSION 
Law is social engineering, according to Roscoe Pound, perhaps the 
country’s preeminent legal scholar.407 It is shaped by the social sciences. 
Yet peek behind the curtain, and there is very little engineering or science 
to be found in many of our laws. The excited utterance exception is a prime 
example of a legal doctrine devoid of the rigors of engineering and science. 
Courts exclude hearsay based on the general presumption that the 
search for truth is improved by bringing witnesses into the courtroom, 
placing them under oath, subjecting them to cross-examination, and 
providing the fact finder with an opportunity to observe the witnesses’ 
demeanor. The hearsay exceptions exist for circumstances where an out-
of-court statement is so likely to be reliable that the justice system is 
willing to forego the safeguards attendant with live testimony. 
As this Article demonstrates, the scientific evidence, though perhaps 
not gap-free or perfect, thoroughly undermines the excited utterance 
exception. As conceived by Wigmore over a hundred years ago, the 
exception has three elements: (1) there must be a startling occasion; (2) 
the out-of-court statement must be made before the declarant has had time 
to fabricate; and (3) the declarant’s out-of-court statement must relate to 
the circumstances of the startling event. Courts today generally apply tests 
that incorporate some version of these three elements. 
Psychology does not implicate the third element, and courts can 
easily assess the connection between the excited utterance and the startling 
event. As for the other two elements, however, psychology tells us both 
that those elements provide no assurance of reliability and that neither the 
recipient nor the court can accurately assess whether these elements are 
satisfied. 
The first element requires a “startling occasion.” The analysis of 
what constitutes a sufficiently startling condition is not confined to the 
nature of the occasion itself. Rather, the analysis depends on a myriad of 
additional circumstances, including the declarant’s psychological and 
physiological condition at the time of the event, the declarant’s personal 
connection to the event, and the declarant’s proximity to the event. Thus, 
the startling nature of witnessing an injury during a sporting event might 
depend on factors like the witness’s stress level at the time of the incident, 
whether the witness has ever played the sport, whether the witness’s child 
                                                     
 407. See, e.g., William L. Grossman, The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 44 YALE L. J. 605, 
608 (1935) (discussing Pound’s “Engineering Theory of law”); Linus McManaman, Social 
Engineering: The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 33 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 16 (1958) (“Law is 
defined as a task of social engineering designed to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of 
unlimited human interests and demands out of a limited store of goods in existence. This is 
undoubtedly the most important aspect of Pound’s doctrine of law.”). 
2017] The Excited Utterance Paradox 177 
or relative was playing in the game, how well the witness was able to see 
the injury, etc. Judges have no training or guidance as to how to make 
these determinations. 
While determining how startling or stressful an event was to an 
individual is problematic, expecting judges to accurately apply the second 
factor is asking the impossible. There is no scientific support for the 
exception’s fundamental premise that a startling event is likely to render a 
witness unable to fabricate. Even when excitement freezes fabrication, 
there is no scientific evidence explicating the duration of the incapacity to 
fabricate. The science does establish, however, that the intensity and 
duration of the emotional effects of a startling occasion are idiosyncratic 
to the particular declarant at the particular point in time in the context of 
the particular event. 
Compounding those idiosyncrasies, the court typically must depend 
on the perceptions and memory of the recipient of the statement to assess 
the emotional state of the declarant. Not only does each declarant express 
emotions uniquely, but the typical recipient is not trained or equipped to 
accurately assess the emotional state of the declarant. The problem is then 
further compounded because the judge must attempt an independent 
assessment of the declarant’s emotional state based on, among other 
things, the recipient’s assessment, akin to hearsay on hearsay. As this 
Article illustrates, all of these determinations are extremely complex and 
nuanced. Trained psychologists would be hard pressed to determine the 
effects of a particular occasion on a specific declarant based on the 
observations of an untrained recipient—asking a judge to make that 
determination is simply not reasonable. 
Furthermore, to the extent that an occasion is sufficiently startling to 
cause the declarant to be unable to lie, the occasion is also likely to 
interfere with the declarant’s ability to accurately perceive and describe 
the occasion. This paradox countenances in favor of elimination of the 
excited utterance altogether. If there is a theoretical “sweet spot” where an 
occurrence is sufficiently startling to render an observer unable to fabricate 
but not sufficiently startling to interfere with the observer’s ability to 
accurately perceive and describe the occurrence, searching for such an 
occurrence would be like hunting the questing beast. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that a judge could identify such an occurrence if it presented itself, 
even with extensive training. 
Certainly, the psychological evidence does not support an exception 
to the hearsay rule premised on the idea that the statement of an observer 
of a startling occasion is more likely to be reliable than other statements. 
Rather, the evidence supports the opposite presumption. It is not feasible 
to refine the exception, adding new factors. As the above discussion of the 
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science demonstrates, this is an enormously complex issue that is not 
reducible to a list of elements that an untrained judge could apply 
meaningfully. The excited utterance exception does not advance the search 
for the truth in legal proceedings, and it should be abolished. 
 
